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1.     Introduction 
 
The issue of labour supply in Sub-Saharan Africa, like so many other economic and 
social issues in the region, is often discussed as if the whole sub-continent faced 
essentially similar, overwhelming and intractable problems. This pessimistic and 
over-generalised literature has been criticized elsewhere (Sender, 1999).  By contrast, 
this paper stresses the importance of differences between and within Sub-Saharan 
African economies in the quantity and quality of labour supplies, and highlights the 
scope for policies to overcome constraints on employment prospects. The paper also 
points to the dangers of one-size-fits-all policy recommendations for the labour 
market, while at the same time identifying certain similarities in the characteristics of 
the most disadvantaged labour market entrants in many Sub-Saharan African 
economies.  The aim is to begin to isolate the sub-set of policies that might be most 
relevant for these entrants, if donors and governments wish to re-allocate resources to 
improve prospects for the poorest Africans.1
 
Not all relevant policies can be discussed. For example, countries "severely affected" 
by HIV/AIDS will need to adopt a different range of policies towards labour supply 
from countries with lower prevalence rates, but the details of preventive and curative 
policy options are not explored. The paper describes the complex effects of violence 
and violent conflicts on many aspects of labour supply, but does not discuss post-war 
reconstruction policy initiatives, or interventions to reduce conflict. And policies that 
influence the demand for labour will have dramatic dynamic effects on the quantity 
and quality of labour supplied, but are largely ignored in this paper. Historically, 
when demand for labour has been strong in Sub-Saharan Africa labour inputs have 
responded in a number of ways. Participation rates have increased; and labour 
migration has risen in response to demand for imported labour. It is also well-known 
that rising demand for labour generates improvements in the quality of the labour 
force, through learning-by-doing processes and static and dynamic returns to scale. 
This paper is not concerned with the detailed analysis of appropriate macroeconomic 
strategies to achieve the level of demand required for rapid growth. The paper does, 
however, examine some of the barriers that workers in different countries currently 
face in responding to changing demand conditions in the labour market. These include 
transport and other barriers to labour mobility (Section 5); the pre-entry structured 
disadvantage experienced by women and certain other categories of worker (Section 
2); the inadequacy of information, communication and money transmission facilities 
available to workers (Section 5); and government policies that are, to different 
degrees in different economies, limiting some workers’ access to the basic education, 
primary health care and the negotiating skills that are required for advantageous 
participation in labour markets (Sections 2-4).  
 
The paper also details the inadequacy of existing data and research on the poorest 
labour market entrants, particularly in a context of uneven and unreliably recorded 
                                                 
1 The sample of countries analysed in most of the tables in this paper account for about 87 percent of 
the total estimated population of Sub-Saharan Africa.     
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HIV/AIDS prevalence. In addition to identifying some priorities for future research 
and the design of more relevant surveys, the paper concludes, on the basis of available 
evidence on the characteristics of these entrants, that too much emphasis has been 
placed on the issue of unemployment and on the existing and potential role of self-
employment in the survival strategies of the poorest people. A new focus on the large 
number of poor women and men who participate in the labour market as workers for 
wages is required.  It is necessary to identify those sectors that, in the short- to 
medium term, are likely to provide them with the forms of wage employment that are 
crucial for their survival. Trends in the real wages of these unrecorded workers should 
be monitored to assess progress in poverty reduction. The paper also highlights some 
other important data and research gaps.  It is argued that more resources need to be 
devoted to understanding and recording the scale and patterns of labour force mobility 
within and between countries and from Africa to the rest of the world and that, 
similarly, more resources should be committed to monitoring the scale, determinants 
and consequences of violence, especially violence against girls and women. 
 
There are several important barriers impeding the entry of the poor into forms of wage 
employment upon which they are most dependent.  Some of these barriers can be 
lowered by appropriate investments in transport, communications and money 
transmission facilities.  Others, including gender discrimination and the political and 
institutional factors reducing the bargaining power of both male and female wage 
workers, will only be overcome by less familiar policy initiatives, including 
legislation and investment to protect the workplace rights of "illegal" migrants and 
expenditures to improve workers' organisational capacity.  Less controversially, the 
paper argues for targeted interventions that focus on increasing both the supply of and 
effective demand for rural schooling. 
  
The paper is organised as follows:  Section 2 focuses on the quantity of labour 
supplies. It begins by highlighting data inadequacies; it then proceeds to a discussion 
of the basic demographic trends that have influenced and will continue to influence 
the quantity (and quality) of the labour supply in different Sub-Saharan African 
countries, highlighting disparities between countries. Section 2 then discusses general 
patterns and inter-country variations in the labour supplies of prime age adults, 
children (including orphans), and youth. It examines these supplies in the context of 
the impact of HIV/AIDS, emphasising the difficulties involved in the projections of 
the labour market impact of the epidemic. 
 
Sections3 and 4 analyse the quality of labour supplies.2 Section 3 provides evidence 
on inter- and intra-country inequalities in the distribution of education, health and 
other services, in order to emphasise the fact that the labour supply from some regions 
and some households will have very different capacities to work productively. This 
section makes the case for policies that prioritise the bottom quintile of each country's 
                                                 
2 This paper discusses labour productivity, health and education but does not use the concept of 
“human capital”, which is theoretically problematic and is typically used ahistorically (Fine, 1998: 
Ch.3 ). Nor does the paper cover the literature based on cross-country regressions purporting to account 
for the contribution of improvements in “human capital” to the growth rate or to the rate of poverty 
reduction or the similar literature estimating average social rates of return to investments in education 
(for critiques of which see Bennell, 1996; and Freeman and Lindauer, 1999; on the inadequacy of time-
series data on income distribution and age-specific education stocks in developing countries and in 
Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, see OECD New Database Paper, 2002). 
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rural population, which can be identified using robust and readily available asset or 
welfare indicators. However, it is also argued that designing appropriate, country-
specific policies will require improved survey data and methods, an argument that is 
taken further in Section 6. 
 
Section 4 identifies the potential for policy reform to improve the future quality of 
African labour supplies. The main influences on labour quality are the capacities to 
educate and to improve the health and skills of the next generation of workers. A 
robust analysis of these capacities, e.g., in schooling, is impeded by the paucity of 
country-specific data. Obviously, HIV/AIDS affects the quality of future labour 
supplies, but this too is not immune to policy. This Section emphasises the need to 
shift expenditures and incentives in order to encourage tertiary education enrolment 
and more effective recruitment of teachers to work in poor rural areas. Other policy 
interventions may also help to improve the poorest children’s access to education, 
including payments to mothers conditional on their children’s school attendance, free 
school meals for poor children and orphans, abolishing requirements for uniforms, 
and eradicating user fees. Similarly, Section 4 highlights the case for redirecting 
donor and government spending to achieve a higher density of health workers, as well 
as reorienting health delivery systems so that they focus less on curative facilities in 
relatively well off areas and more on rural, preventative facilities staffed by 
community nurses and other auxiliary health workers (who are also less likely to 
emigrate than more professionally trained health workers). Section 4 also discusses 
technical, vocational education, training and skills programmes. It concludes, first, 
that there is no evidence that these have been an effective mechanism for enhancing 
basic labour market skills and, second, that their objectives may more effectively and 
progressively be met by investing in basic literacy and numeracy and by enhancing all 
workers’ capacities to negotiate with employers and to press for improved in-service 
training.  
 
Section 5 focuses on labour mobility, arguing that many forms of mobility are 
important to poverty reduction and that constraints on mobility restrict the growth of 
labour productivity and poverty eradication efforts.  It traces the main patterns of 
mobility in Sub-Saharan Africa, emphasising the vast scale and unevenness of 
mobility, the variety of factors affecting mobility and the inadequacy of the data. The 
roles of violence and direct and indirect forms of coercion in propelling population 
movements and creating labour supplies are stressed. The section then examines the 
available data on flows of migrants from Africa to the rest of the world and to other 
African countries, before focusing on international flows of highly skilled labour, the 
remittances of these skilled workers and other implications of these flows.  A larger 
group of Sub-Saharan cross-border migrants are then examined, namely: refugees, 
forced migrants and displaced people.  The Section continues with a brief discussion 
of the evidence on trafficking, followed by a more detailed analysis of the relationship 
between violence and labour supply. The policy implications, apart from the urgent 
need to invest in transport and communications infrastructure, are discussed in the 
final part of this Section.  They include the need to recognise and record more 
accurately migrant African labourers as a foundation for interventions to facilitate 
their mobility and to protect them from abusive relationships. 
 
Section 6 contains more detailed discussion of some of the policy implications of the 
earlier analysis. It starts by focusing on the importance of efforts to improve the data 
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that should underpin all policy interventions, paying particular attention to the Living 
Standards Measurement Surveys funded by the World Bank. The emphasis 
throughout this paper is on the conditions affecting labour supply among those in the 
poorest quintile of the population. This Section argues that encouraging growth in 
sectors that are intensive in the use of unskilled (female) labour will determine 
whether or not many of the poorest labour market entrants can survive. However, it is 
also important to increase the organisational and bargaining capacity of workers in 
these and other sectors, because there is no automatic mechanism smoothly linking 
employment expansion to poverty reduction. Further, concentrating on those 
particular sectors (and geographical areas) will make it easier, in the context of scarce 
resources and fiscal constraints, to make some progress with the other policies 
recommended throughout this paper, including the construction and maintenance of 
health facilities and the recruitment and motivation of primary school teachers. 
 
 
2.   Cross-Country Comparative Data on Labour Supply 
 
2.1 Introduction: Data Inadequacies 
 
Population Censuses and Labour Force Surveys are commonly used as primary 
sources of information on labour supply.  These sources are used throughout this 
Section.  However, very few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have carried out Labour 
Force Surveys (LFS) and Censuses are often outdated (Tables A1 and A11). Yet, 
many outdated Censuses have been used as sampling frames for Living Standards 
Measurement (Household Budget) Surveys  (LSMS) and for Core Welfare Indicators 
Questionnaire Surveys (CWIQS), which are increasingly becoming the main source 
of information used for labour market policy making. In fact, more than 45 LSMS and 
18 CWIQS have been completed or begun since the mid-1980s3, whereas only 10 LFS 
are included in the survey lists published by the World Bank. In 1994, a WB study on 
labour markets and structural adjustment only included three Sub-Saharan African 
country case studies (Kenya, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire), of which just one was based 
on a labour force survey (Kenya). 
 
Nevertheless, Labour Force Surveys and Population Censuses remain the primary 
sources for the ILO database (LABORSTA http://laborsta.ilo.org), providing the data 
for measures of the economically active population, employment-to-population ratios 
and the growth of the labour force, by gender and age groups (Behrman and 
Rosenzweig, 1994: 161). The response rates for a number of important indicators in 
Sub-Saharan Africa are low: zero percent for employment-to-population ratios, 14 
percent for unemployment rates and 2 percent for youth unemployment rates 
(Schaible and Mahadevan-Vijaya, 2002: 2). The gaps in the data, both for individual 
countries and periods of time, have two implications. First, many countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa have no reliable data on labour supply and we know practically 
nothing about labour demand and labour market dynamics in these countries. Second, 
the data shown for the countries covered are often based on estimates and projections 
that rely on brave assumptions concerning population dynamics (natural rates of 
                                                 
3 There are also up to 66 income and expenditure surveys recorded in the African Monitoring Database, 
but many of these surveys do not include information on employment.  
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growth, age composition and migration), as well as on assumptions about the 
distribution of the labour force by sector, occupation and status.  
 
It is, therefore, hardly surprising that different agencies publish very different 
estimates for key labour market statistics.  For example, African Development 
Indicators 2003 shows interpolated data on the labour force (economically active 
population) for a complete time series. The ILO database presents data from the 
primary sources, so not all years are included. In Ethiopia, it is striking to note that the 
World Bank records a labour force of nearly 17 million people in 1980, while 
according to the ILO database there are only 14 million economically active people. 
In a number of random checks for the sample of countries covered in this paper 
similar inconsistencies appear between these two data sources, which is surprising 
because the ILO is cited as the source for the World Bank series. 
  
This Section provides a cross-country comparative analysis of the underlying 
demographic determinants of the total labour supply.  Trends in the quantity of labour 
supplied by adults, children and youth are discussed in the subsequent sub-Sections.  
It is regrettable that more reliable data were not available, particularly to analyse the 
impact of HIV/AIDS on labour supplies.  The starting point for any analysis of the 
impact of HIV/AIDS should be recent data on prevalence and mortality rates. 
Unfortunately, there is remarkably little good quality information available that would 
enable the levels and thus trends in national HIV prevalence rates to be accurately 
monitored (Bennell, 2003a).  No country in Sub-Saharan Africa collects reliable “vital 
registration” data on deaths.4  As a consequence, all figures describing the number of 
AIDS-related deaths in Africa are estimates of some kind (Ngom and Clark, 2003: 3). 
UNAIDS warn that their published estimates of HIV prevalence should be viewed as 
having an accuracy of +/- 25 percent (Zaba et al, 2003: 13).  
 
There is little population-based survey data providing information on age and gender-
specific HIV infection rates by location and socio-economic background.  Instead, 
HIV prevalence estimates rely on the testing of those pregnant women who attend 
public sector antenatal clinics (ANCs).  This is not an accurate method for measuring 
national, age-specific, or male prevalence levels.  Inaccuracies arise because: 
 
• Sentinel surveillance in ANC clinics has an inherent selection bias against 
women using modern contraceptives.  Women who have adopted consistent 
condom use are less likely to become pregnant and to attend the clinics. 
• In the countries with more mature epidemics, there is some concern that 
ANC data may underestimate HIV prevalence, because of falling fertility 
among HIV positive women (Whiteside et al, 2003:10-11).  If fertility is 
considerably lower among HIV-positive women, available estimates of HIV 
prevalence may be downwardly biased (United Nations, 2004c: 26). 
• Rural data are biased towards larger villages and settlements close to towns 
and roads.  Rural samples tend to be small and have often been biased 
towards more seriously affected rural areas (Dyson, 2003: 428).  Very poor 
rural women and those living in more remote rural areas are less likely to 
attend antenatal clinics, as suggested by the data in Table 10. 
                                                 
4 Even in South Africa the registration of adult deaths remains incomplete, there are long delays in 
publishing official statistics, and there is unreliable certification of AIDS (Bradshaw et al, 2004). 
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It is hoped that the inclusion of HIV-testing of adults in the more recent DHS 
nationwide population-based samples in Malawi, Kenya and Uganda will provide 
more accurate estimates of age- and location-specific prevalence.  However, both 
DHS and ANC data have to be combined with population census data to estimate 
national prevalence rates. If the last census is judged to have been unreliable, DHS 
may be forced to use another sampling frame, such as the electoral lists in 
Mozambique; but these electoral lists may well not be accurate.5   
 
Moreover, as noted above, the published population census data for many Sub-
Saharan African countries are often five or more years old (US Census Bureau, 2004), 
e.g. in Swaziland, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Cote D'Ivoire and Ethiopia.  Large 
population shifts may have taken place in the intervening years (see below, Section 
5), as a result of war, famine and forced migration, and changes in fundamental 
demographic variables such as fertility rates may have been faster than expected.   
There are, in addition, several other problems with the African population census data 
used to derive not only estimates of HIV prevalence, but also all labour force 
estimates.  Undercounting may be caused by logistical difficulties, accessibility and 
risk; misreporting is difficult to correct in the absence of alternative cross-checking 
lists;6 and censorship by governments may affect the published estimates of the 
regional breakdown of the population.  In sum, the combination of unreliable 
prevalence data with unreliable population census data is bound to exacerbate the 
problem of interpreting the results. 
 
Projections of the impact of HIV on the labour supply need strong assumptions about 
the distribution of the time of progression from HIV infections to AIDS and from 
AIDS to death. Such projections would also have to build in assumptions about how 
this progression affects capacity for labour market participation. Very small changes 
in the assumptions made regarding progression time have important effects on 
projected mortality, but it is acknowledged that there is a great deal of uncertainty 
about the reliability of the particular assumptions made by UNAIDS and used in the 
Population Division's 2004 projections of the impact of HIV (United Nations, 2004c: 
26). Similarly, for its projections of labour supply, the ILO has made assumptions 
about the duration of the periods when individuals are first partially and eventually 
fully unable to work without treatment and before death.  Thus, they define a stage 
during which a person living with HIV/AIDS is bedridden for up to 50 percent of the 
time and can only work for 50 percent of the time (Stage3); and another, when a 
person is bedridden for more than 50 percent of the time and cannot work at all. 
However, the ILO admits that its assumptions are based on "a very small" body of 
literature on the progression of HIV/AIDS from the onset of symptoms to death (ILO, 
2004a: 67).  The first empirical evidence available on the impact of HIV/AIDS on 
labour productivity, also published in 2004, suggests that pre-AIDS morbidity affects 
                                                 
5 In the recent DHS for Nigeria the sampling frame was the list of enumeration areas developed for the 
dated and unreliable 1991 Population Census (DHS, 2004, 211). Other evidence suggests that the 
quality of data collected in the Nigerian DHS may be low (Case et al, 2002, 6). 
6 Even in countries with sophisticated census facilities, such as South Africa and the USA, “illegal” 
backyard shack residents or migrant workers are often undercounted (Wittenberg, 2004; Lobo, 2002).  
In Sub-Saharan Africa, interviewers and respondents can have differing interpretations of the concept 
of “a person who is usually resident”, because of difficulties of defining this concept in contexts where 
the population is extremely mobile and the complex patterns of household formation do not conform to 
the stereotype of stable, nuclear families (Chamie, 1994). 
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the ability and productivity of infected workers over a substantially longer period of 
time than has previously been recognised (Fox et al, 2004:323). 
 
Unfortunately, the problems in projecting the size and timing of the impact of 
HIV/AIDS on women, men and children in different Sub-Saharan African countries 
are much more complex than suggested in the previous paragraphs (Ngom and Clark, 
2003; Zaba et al, 2003; Gregson et al, 2002). For example, these projections depend 
on weakly grounded assumptions about population-specific behavioural factors, such 
as current and future sexual networking preferences, as well as on assumptions about 
vertical transmission rates under different treatment regimes in the future. Projections 
also depend upon future trends in conflict and violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, since 
wars are known to spread infection (Section 5). But it is difficult to conceive a method 
of predicting the outbreak of wars. As Keynes noted when referring to the prospects 
of a European war, "About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form 
any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know!" (Keynes, 1937, 241).  
 
2.2 Basic Demographic Characteristics: Population Size, Growth Rates and 
Age Composition 
 
Despite the data limitations noted above, there is little doubt that the basic 
demographic characteristics that will continue to influence the supply of labour, both 
the absolute supply and its quality, differ very substantially between the economies of 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  This is true not only in the trivial sense that the current working 
age population is, for example, about 25 times larger in Ethiopia than in Swaziland, 
Lesotho or Mauritania; there are also significant differences in the recent and 
projected growth rates of the population and labour force between countries.  For 
example, between 2000 and 2005, the estimated annual rate of growth of population 
in Uganda is 3.24 percent and in Mauritania, Ethiopia, Senegal and Ghana it is well 
over two percent, whereas in Lesotho it is barely positive (0.14 percent) and in five 
other countries in our sample it is only 1.6 percent or below (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Total Population and Population Growth Rates, 2000-2005  
 
 
Total Population  
2005 
(Thousands) 
 
Annual Population Growth (%) 
Years: 2000-2005 
(Medium Variant) 
 
Cote d'Ivoire 
17,165 
1.62 
 
Ethiopia 
74,189 
2.46 
 
Ghana 
21,833 
2.17 
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Kenya 
32,849 
1.45 
 
Lesotho 
1,797 
0.14 
 
Malawi 
12,572 
2.01 
 
Mauritania 
3,069 
2.98 
 
Mozambique 
19,495 
1.75 
 
Senegal 
10,587 
2.39 
 
South Africa 
45,323 
0.59 
 
Swaziland 
1,087 
0.80 
 
Tanzania 
38,365 
1.93 
 
Uganda 
27,623 
3.24 
 
Zambia 
11,043 
1.16 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
732,510 
2.28 
 
 
 
Source:  United Nations (2004b). 
 
 
The current age structure and, therefore, the proportion of the population of working 
age (defined here as the population aged between 15 and 59 years) is also very 
different across African countries, as is the distribution of the population between 
rural and urban areas.  For example, only 12 percent of Uganda's population was 
urban in 2003, compared to 62 percent of the population in Mauritania; differences 
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between African countries in recent and projected annual rates of change in the urban 
proportion of the population are equally stark, with projected rates for 2005-2010 of 
above 2.4 percent in Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania, compared to rates of 
about one percent or below in several other countries in the sample (Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Urbanization in 2003 and Projected Rates of Urbanization, 2005-2010a
 
 
Percentage of the 
Population Urban 
(2003) 
Annual Rate of Change 
of Percentage Urban 
2005-2010 (%) 
Cote d'Ivoire 45 1.1 
Ethiopia 16 1.9 
Ghana 45 1.0 
Kenya 40 2.4 
Lesotho 18 1.2 
Malawi 16 2.6 
Mauritania 62 1.6 
Mozambique 36 2.7 
Senegal 50 1.3 
South Africa 57 0.8 
Swaziland 24 1.0 
Tanzania 35 2.5 
Uganda 12 1.1 
Zambia 36 1.1 
Africa (2005) 
 
 
40 3.4 
 
 
Source:  United Nations (2004a). 
 a In this and many other tables of this paper numbers have been rounded from the original source. 
 
While most economies in Sub-Saharan Africa contain a relatively large proportion of 
young people, reflected in a median age of only 17.5 years (compared to a median age 
of 26 years in Asia), there is a wide disparity in the median ages of the populations of 
different Sub-Saharan African economies.  For example, the median age in Uganda in 
2000 was estimated as 15.1 years, compared to 18.8 years in Ghana and Lesotho, and 
22.6 years in South Africa. Thus, in several countries only a low percentage (50 
percent or less) of the population is of working age. The ILO has projected the 
dependency ratio (defined as dependents per 100 non-dependent persons in 2005) for 
35 African economies, including most of those covered in this paper (Table 3). 
Unsurprisingly, this ratio is much higher in Uganda (112) than, e.g., in Ghana (73) or 
South Africa (57).  The projected percentage increase in the population of working 
age over the period 2000 to 2010 ranges from 35.6 percent in Uganda to 17.8 percent 
in Mozambique and to only 5.2 percent in Lesotho (UNCTAD, 2004: Table 19). 
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Table 3: Median Age, the Working Age Population as a Percentage of the Total 
Population, and Projected Dependency Ratios  
 
 
Working Age 
Population as % 
Total Population 
(2000)* 
Median Age 
 of the 
 Total Population 
(2000)* 
Projected Dependency 
Ratio: 
Dependents per 100 
Nondependent Persons 
(2005)** 
Cote d'Ivoire 52.3 18.1 78 
Ethiopia 49.5 16.9 93 
Ghana 53.9 18.8 73 
Kenya 52.4 17.7 76 
Lesotho 52.6 18.8 79 
Malawi 49.2 17.1 101 
Mauritania 51.4 18.2 … 
Mozambique 50.9 17.8 88 
Senegal 51.8 17.6 … 
South Africa 60.1 22.6 57 
Swaziland 50.9 17.4 87 
Tanzania … 16.8 88 
Uganda 46.2 15.1 112 
Zambia 51.4 16.7 99 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
50.9 17.5 
 
87 
    Asia (5 Countries)  26.1 49** 
       Eastern Asia 64.9 30.8  
South-Central Asia  57.4 22.4  
 
Sources:  *United Nations (2003); ** (ILO, 2004a: 74). 
 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic will have a major impact on the age and sex composition 
and the rates of growth of the population and labour force of Sub-Saharan African 
economies. The scale, scope and timing of the impact on the quantity and quality of 
labour supplied are extremely difficult to estimate precisely, but will certainly be 
different in each country. This Section of this paper will present some evidence on the 
impact of HIV/AIDS on the quantity of labour supplied in different Sub-Saharan 
African countries, focussing initially on the supply of prime age adults, before turning 
to the supplies of child and youth labour. The following Section will focus on the 
productivity or quality of the anticipated supplies of labour in different countries in 
the first decades of the twenty first century.  
 
2.3 The Impact of HIV/AIDS on the Prime Age Adult Labour Supply 
 
In many of the high prevalence countries in Southern Africa, less than 40 percent of 
current survivors to age 15 will celebrate their sixtieth birthdays (Ngom and Clark, 
2003: 2).7  For both females and males of working age, higher national HIV 
prevalence rates increase the probability of dying between the ages of 20 and 60, but 
the impact on females in this age group generally occurs at younger ages and is more 
focused on a narrow age band (ibid: 7).  Thus, throughout Sub-Saharan Africa young 
                                                 
7 In Botswana, for example, it is predicted that by 2025 more than half of the potential population aged 35-59 will 
have been lost to AIDS (United Nations, 2004c: 21). 
 10
women (aged 15-24 years) are twice as likely as young men to be living with 
HIV/AIDS (UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/lifeskills/index.html ).  Recent South African data 
indicate even greater gender disparities, with females in this age group being 3 times 
more likely to be infected than males (Bradshaw et al, 2004:140). About a quarter of 
the slightly older young adult females (aged between 20 and 24 years) are HIV 
positive in South Africa, compared to only 7.6 percent of males in the same age group 
(RHRU, 2004: 29). A smaller survey in Kenya found that over 27 percent of girls 
aged 15-19 were infected with HIV compared to 4.6 percent of boys in the same age 
group (Glynn et al, 2001).   
 
In high prevalence countries such as South Africa, as well as in areas like Kisumu 
(Kenya), the death of large numbers of relatively young adult females has important 
short- and medium-term implications for the age composition of female labour 
supplies and for the care-giving obligations of older women, who will devote years of 
labour to washing, feeding and nursing the chronically ill (Steinberg et al, 2002:15).  
There are also important implications for the children of this large group of women, 
since they will receive relatively few years of maternal care.  The implication is that 
the nutritional status and the quality of the future labour force will be adversely 
affected.8 Children will be deprived "of those very things they need to become 
economically productive adults – their parents’ loving care, knowledge and capacity 
to finance education" (Bell et al, 2003:92).   
 
These inter-generational productivity effects will probably have more obvious and 
serious economic consequences than those suggested by the aggregative quantitative 
changes in labour supply projected by the ILO.  The proportion of the total labour 
force that will have died as a result of HIV/AIDS by 2005 appears to be quite small in 
Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (3.2 percent), according to ILO definitions of the 
labour force and ILO projections,9 although this proportion is obviously much higher 
in some countries than others (Table 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Household expenditures on child-related goods – in particular on healthy foods – are lower when a 
child's biological mother is absent (Case et al, 2002: 2). 
9 The ILO defines the “labour force” as the sum of all persons who are economically active—a formal definition 
encompassing all persons of working age who are in paid employment, gainful self-employment, or unemployed, 
but available for and seeking work. The labour force is quantified by summing the products of economic activity 
rates estimated by the ILO for each age and sex group and the population weights of the same age and sex groups 
(ILO, 2004a: 4).   
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Table 4: Estimated and Projected Labour 
 Force Losses as a Result of HIV/AIDS   
 
Countries in 
Alphabetical Order  
Estimated number of 
persons 15-64 years in 
the labour force who 
are HIV positive in 2003 
 
Projected Cumulative mortality losses to the 
total labour force as a result of HIV/AIDS, as 
an equivalent proportion of the total labour 
force, 2005 
 
Côte d’Ivoire 399,400 5.2 
Ethiopia   1,336,766 2.1 
Ghana 292,297 1.5 
Kenya  1,003,534 4.2 
Lesotho  211,300 8.3 
Malawi  737,700 6.9 
Mozambique  1,128,500 2.4 
South Africa   3,698,827 2.5 
Swaziland  134,100 4.9 
Uganda  454,242 8.4 
Tanzania  1,401,300 3.3 
Zambia  726,800 10.2 
Total 
 (Sub-Saharan 
 Africa, 35 Countries, 
Weighted ) 
18,610,517 3.2 
Total (Asia, 5 
countries) 
 
4,886,600 
 
0.2 
 
Source: ILO, 2004a. 
 
 
There is disaggregated evidence to suggest that the risk of HIV-related death is 
particularly high for those young female adults who have few years of education 
(UNICEF, 2004b).  Thus, in South Africa, among those adults aged 20-24, HIV 
positive females had completed significantly fewer years of education than HIV 
negative females.  Condom use was much lower among rural (less educated) than 
urban (more educated) youth in South Africa.  Higher levels of education have often 
been associated with condom use elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa (RHRU, 2004: 33; 
Luke, 2002:9-10).10   There is also strong evidence that the children of poorly 
educated mothers are at relatively high risk of malnutrition and illiteracy (Smith and 
Haddad, 1999).  The policy implication is that resources need to be focused on young 
females who are at risk of failing to attend school or of early school dropout, who are 
concentrated in the rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa.  Unfortunately, health and 
education expenditures are not currently concentrated on these rural young women 
(Section 3); the consequences for the quality of the labour that will be supplied by 
their children are extremely serious. 
    
2.4 The Impact of HIV/AIDS on Child Labour Supply 
 
Estimating the effect of HIV/AIDS on potential child labour supply depends, in part, 
on being able to assess the trend in child mortality among uninfected children.  The 
United Nations Population Division projections indicate that child mortality among 
uninfected children is declining at very different rates in different Sub-Saharan 
                                                 
10 Despite the efficacy and low cost of condoms there has been remarkably little effort to increase the 
supply of condoms to poor rural Africans.  The number of condoms available per man aged 15-59 per 
year averages only 4.6 in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Donor funding of condom supply has not increased in 
the period since 1995 (Shelton and Johnston, 2004)  
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African countries and that these countries also exhibit marked disparities in initial 
levels of child mortality.  These differing "background" trends may exacerbate or 
mask the deterioration in mortality that is attributable to HIV.  For example, a country 
with a high "background" level of child mortality, such as Malawi (Table 5), may 
continue to experience an overall decline in child mortality in the face of HIV, if it 
manages to sustain the rapid rate of decline in non-HIV related child mortality that it 
achieved in recent years.   
 
In contrast, in countries with relatively low initial levels of child mortality (and high 
HIV prevalence) such as Botswana, child mortality has risen very sharply and HIV 
attributable mortality is now over 50 percent.  In Uganda, declines in "background" 
mortality coincide with an estimated decrease in HIV prevalence, with the result that 
the fraction of child mortality attributable to HIV is declining.  These contrasts in the 
proportion of overall child mortality that is attributable to HIV in different countries 
are illustrated in Figure 1.  It may be concluded that trends in child mortality will 
differ between countries, not only because of the marked differences in the rates at 
which HIV prevalence increases, but also because of differences in non-HIV related 
child mortality.  It is clear that expenditures to reduce non-HIV mortality could 
continue to play a major role in overall child mortality reduction in several African 
countries, quite apart from expenditures on the available cost-effective treatments to 
reduce rates of mother to child HIV-transmission (Wilkinson et al, 2000).     
 
Figure 1:  HIV Population Attributable Fraction of Child Mortality, 1990 to 
2001 
 
     Source: Zaba et al, 2003: 10. 
 
In addition to the epidemiological and demographic factors differentially affecting 
future supplies of child labour, there is patchy evidence from studies sponsored by the 
ILO that some countries are much more likely to provide child entrants to the labour 
market than others. In other words, the proportion of children who work, as a 
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percentage of the age cohort, appears to vary a great deal between countries (Table 5, 
Column 3).  This variation suggests that the circumstances that produce child labour 
are not immutable across the African region and that there is scope for government 
policy to reduce child labour. 
 
Table 5: Working children aged 5 to 17, in thousands (percent of cohort shown 
in brackets) 
 
Country 
Year 
of 
survey 
Total 
economically 
active (including 
“light” work) 
Child 
labourers 
(economic 
activities only) 
Total active 
(economic and 
non-economic) 
     
Ethiopia 2001 9,463 (52%) n.a. 15,468 (85%) 
Ghana 2001 2,475 (39%) 1,273 (20%) 5,661 (89%) 
Kenya 1998/9 1, 894 (17%) 1, 305 (12%) n.a. 
Namibia 1999 72 (16%) n.a. n.a. 
S. Africa 1999 1,979 (15%) 1,136 (8%) 6,040 (45%) 
Tanzania 2000/1 4,736 (40%) 1,168 (10%) n.a. 
Uganda 2000/1 2,677 (34%) n.a. n.a. 
Zambia 1999 595 (16%) n.a. n.a. 
Zimbabwe 1999 1,226 (26%) 356 (8%) n.a. 
    
Sources:  Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2001, Ghana Statistical Service 2003, Republic of Kenya 2001, 
Namibia Ministry of Labour 2000, Statistics South Africa 2001, Tanzania Ministry of Labour, Youth Development 
& Sports nd, Ugandan Bureau of Statistics nd, Republic of Zambia n.d., Zimbabwe nd  
 
However, not all of the work performed by children falls under the definition of 
“Child Labour” used by the ILO and incorporated in Table 5 (Column 4).  Their 
approach excludes children engaged in work considered to be non-economic in nature, 
for example, domestic work within the household.  However, such "non-economic" 
activities may themselves be substantial enough to prevent a child from attending 
school and so the use of the ILO definition is likely to bias downwards estimates of 
relevant child labour with a particular impact on the estimates of girls who are 
involved in a detrimental level of domestic work (Basu & Tzannatos, 2003:156).  This 
concern applies more widely, with many other labour force or child labour surveys 
failing to consider the full range of types of work done by children, including not only 
domestic work, but also seasonal piece work as part of mother-child agricultural 
labour teams.   
 
The inclusion of household work can lead to significant differences in the data on the 
overall number of working children, and on the gender burden of work.  For example, 
the Ethiopia 2001 Child Labour Report (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
2001) finds that 85 percent of the 5-17 age group is involved in some kind of work, if 
"non-economic" activities are included (Table 5, Column 5). This falls to 52 percent if 
only directly productive activities are included.  Considering only directly productive 
activities, 62 percent of boys are active and 42 percent of girls. However, the situation 
is reversed when housekeeping activities are taken into account, as these are 
dominated by girls (with an activity rate of 44% for girls compared to 23% for boys).   
 
Also excluded from the ILO data on child labour are those children who are 
economically active between the ages of 12 and 14, when they are considered to be 
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engaged in light work (defined as less than 14 hours a week). Table 5 provides 
separate estimates of the number of all economically active children, including those 
engaged in light work (Column 3), as well the ILO's estimates of child labour 
(Column 4). It also provides the few survey estimates of the total number of active 
children that include children involved in "non-economic" activities (Column 5).11   
 
As well as substantial differences between African countries, the ILO-sponsored 
studies also show substantial differences in the supply of child labour within 
countries.  These are complex; they cannot be simplified into a rural-urban 
dichotomy, or summarised by reference to the characteristics of children living in 
poorer as opposed to wealthier households.12 In fact, studies in different countries do 
not agree on the degree to which household poverty can explain the pattern of child 
labour.  Early entry into the labour market and incomplete basic education depend on 
changing sets of factors that are likely to vary from household to household and to be 
affected by changes in demand and supply conditions, as well as by the pattern of 
state expenditure on schooling and rural infrastructure.13  For example, survey data 
from the Kagera region of Tanzania indicate that households increased their use of 
child labour in response to sharp declines in the total value of crops farmed due to 
pests, diseases and calamities such as fires (Beegle et al, 2003).  Similarly, a study 
based on LSMS data from Cote d’Ivoire suggests that economic recession led to a 
contra-cyclical general rise in child economic activity (Grootaert, 1998:13).  Grootaert 
identified five key factors which affected a household’s decision to supply child 
labour: the age and gender of the child, the education and employment status of 
parents, the availability of within household employment opportunities, the 
household’s poverty status and its geographic location.  Not only was labour market 
participation likely to increase with age of the child, but there were also clear trends 
by gender, with girls less likely to attend school and more likely to engage in 
household tasks.  In rural areas, having a female household-head meant that a child 
was more likely to work.  In addition, parents with no or low education were more 
likely to have children engaged in work.  Grootaert describes the presence of 
household enterprises as a ‘double-edged sword’ (ibid, 1998:65).  On the one hand, 
increased income will decrease the likelihood that a child will work, although he 
noted that ownership of a household enterprise was a positive correlate of poverty in 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that the surveys that were the sources for the data in Table 5 did not always use the same 
approaches and definitions.  They are not strictly comparable and cannot be an adequate basis for published 
estimates of the percentage of the cohort aged 5 to 14 years that is working in the Sub-Saharan African region as a 
whole (Table A13).     
12 Many of the studies provide a rural-urban breakdown of the data and these show that the prevalence 
of child labour is often higher in rural areas.  For example, the Zambian survey found that only 5 
percent of children were likely to be economically active in urban areas, compared to 23 percent in 
rural areas (Republic of Zambia n.d.:25).  Participation rates also varied widely by province, with a 
participation rate of 25 percent in Southern province and one of only 4 percent in Lusaka province.  
The South African study produced more detailed disaggregated data, reporting the prevalence of 
children working in either productive or domestic tasks in a formal urban area (23 percent), informal 
urban area (23 percent), commercial farming area (48 percent) and other rural area (64 percent) 
(Statistics South Africa 2001:35).  Other studies have shown marked differences between child workers 
within the same country in term of the sectors in which they work and their age- and gender-specific 
participation rates. 
13 The influence of state expenditure on schooling on the age-specific participation rates of girls in the 
casual agricultural wage labour markets in India and, therefore, on real wages and poverty in rural 
India, has been explored by Sen and Ghosh (1993). 
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Cote d’Ivoire.  On the other hand, the presence of a household enterprise meant that it 
was more likely that a child would work.   
 
Similarly, an econometric analysis of Ghanaian data (Canagarajah and Coulombe, 
1997) suggests that poverty is not the main factor behind child labour, with a 
statistically weak relationship (see also Nielsen 1998, who finds no positive 
relationship between poverty and child labour in Zambia).  Instead, family 
characteristics had a strong role to play in the decision over school or work, with 
households who earned a larger share of their income from family enterprises, 
farming or otherwise, having a higher child labour participation rate (ibid: 27).14    
 
Another study of Ghanaian data contradicts some of these conclusions and does find a 
positive relationship between poverty and child labour, as well as evidence of a 
gender gap in child labour linked to poverty, with girls as a group as well as across 
urban, rural and poverty sub-samples being consistently more likely to engage in 
harmful child labour than boys (Blunch and Verner, 2000: 3).  Similarly, an 
econometric analysis of the ILO data on economic activity within SSA countries finds 
a strong and significant statistical relationship between the incidence of poverty and 
the prevalence of child economic activity (Admassie, 2002:267).  Whilst the impact 
was small, poverty was one of the most significant variables arising from his study.15  
 
The supply of child migrant labour from Benin, where 8 percent of all rural children 
aged between 6 and 16 years have left their parental households to work (half of them 
leaving for other countries, with boys heading for plantations in the Cote D'Ivoire and 
the girls mainly looking for domestic service in Gabon), cannot be explained by the 
relative poverty of the migrant-sending households. In fact, relatively wealthy rural 
households may be more likely to be able to finance such migrations (Andvig et al, 
2001: 13). Elsewhere, when long-distance migration is not involved, there is evidence 
that rural child domestic servants do come from extremely poor households, or are 
orphans (Sender et al, 2004).  Since the market for domestic servants is probably the 
most extensive market for child labour in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is remarkable how 
little research has been conducted into the poverty of the households supplying the 
children concerned, into remittance behaviour, or into these children's real wages and 
working conditions.  The economic history of the developed economies suggests that 
a very high and increasing proportion of young girls will, over the next few decades 
of economic development in Africa, enter the labour market as domestic servants 
(Roberts, 1995; Vickery, 1998; Bras, 2003). 
 
There has also been little research that focuses on the specific issue of the impact of 
HIV/AIDS on the labour market participation of children.  The ILO has not attempted 
                                                 
14This result is supported by Bhalotra & Heady’s (2003) analysis of an early Ghanaian living standard 
survey.  These authors found that girls in land rich households were more likely to work than girls in 
land poor households.    
15 Admassie also suggests that differing agricultural technologies within SSA could provide another 
explanatory variable for divergent patterns of child labour prevalence. His conclusion is that promoting 
improved agricultural technologies that are less unskilled-labour intensive would have the effect of 
reducing the demand for child labour as well as playing an important role in reducing poverty.  
However, historical studies of the impact of technological change on child labour in the developed 
countries suggest that early technological change was often facilitated by the use of child labour, and 
that later changes that appeared to discourage child labour were often bolstered by legislation 
(Humphries, 2001:181-2). 
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to include child labour in its estimates of the impact of HIV on the projected size of 
the labour force.  Its recent projections of the HIV-affected and non-affected labour 
force are based on the numbers of people defined as economically active between the 
ages of 15 and 64 years, ignoring the labour force aged between 5 and 14 years (ILO, 
2004a: 66).  The few available micro-studies of the effects of HIV/AIDS on rural 
households have typically been confined to geographic areas known to have high HIV 
prevalence.  Their findings cannot, therefore, be extrapolated to a national scale. 
Besides, they suggest that rural responses to the death of a prime age adult are 
heterogeneous, with affected households replacing agricultural labour through the 
arrival of new adult members, through labour hiring and by changing their cropping 
patterns and varying the input mix, rather than by resorting to child labour (Mather et 
al, 2004).  
 
Micro data from 24 districts in rural Kenya suggest that households adjust, after 
experiencing the death of a working age female (who is not the head of the household 
or the female spouse of the head of household), by attracting “boys” into the 
household.  The labour of these newly resident young male relatives appears to 
substitute for the tasks previously performed by the deceased woman, although no 
information is provided on whether or not these boys should be considered as new 
entrants into the child labour force (Yamano and Jayne, 2004:102).16 A larger scale 
study in Tanzania found that, “Analysis of farm and chore hours across demographic 
groups generally found small and insignificant changes in labor supply of individuals 
in households experiencing a prime-age adult death. The lack of an increase in hours 
… is notable for children in particular for whom deaths are presumed to result in 
higher farm hours assuming there will be an acute shortage of farm labor” (Beegle, 
2003:24-5).17
 
Thus, there is no reliable direct evidence suggesting that AIDS orphans are more 
likely than other orphans or children to enter the market for child labour. Whether or 
not children and orphans enter labour markets appears to be context specific, with 
some orphans and AIDS orphans having access to household or extended family 
resources that enable them to avoid premature entry, even if they experience serious 
emotional distress and other, long-term adverse consequences. Nevertheless, the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic is clearly having a massive impact on the total number of 
orphans in Sub-Saharan Africa.  At the end of 2001, the proportion of orphans in SSA 
who were AIDS orphans has been estimated at 32 percent. By 2010, it has been 
estimated that the proportion will be 48 percent. Those countries with the highest 
prevalence of HIV already have the highest prevalence of orphans, although countries 
                                                 
16 Another Kenyan micro study refers to anecdotal evidence that those workers on tea estates who were 
suffering as a result of HIV/AIDS were more likely than a control group of workers to "bring helpers" 
with them to pluck tea (Fox et al, 2004: 323).  It is likely that some of these family "helpers" were 
children. 
17 Another Tanzanian study, comparing the 2000/01 Integrated Labor Force Survey with results from 
the 1990/91 Labor Force Survey, comes to different, though tentative, conclusions.  The authors found 
a dramatic increase in labour force participation rates for children aged 10-14, and a much milder 
increase for those aged 15-19, while education transition matrices drawn from enrolment data suggest 
an increased tendency during the 1990s to exit primary school.  However, these two labour force 
surveys are not comparable.  Therefore the recorded increase in child labour participation in the period 
between the surveys may not, in fact, reflect the spread of the epidemic or labour market realities 
(Arndt and Wobst, 2002: 8-9).  
 17
that have experienced violent conflict, such as Mozambique and Rwanda, also have a 
large proportion of children who are orphaned (Grassley and Timaeus, 2003, 4-6).  
 
The percentage of the relevant age group (0-14 years) that is orphaned varies 
dramatically between countries, from less than 6 percent (Ghana) to 12 percent or 
more in Uganda and Mozambique (ibid: 10).  The ILO estimates the absolute number 
of orphans in Sub-Saharan Africa as a result of HIV/AIDS in 2003 (12 million),18 but 
the inter-country range is striking, from only 65,000 children in Swaziland to about 
one million children in Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa (Table 6). 
 
  
Table 6: HIV Prevalence and Numbers of Orphans, 2003  
 
Countries in 
Alphabetical Order  
Estimated HIV 
Prevalence 
in 
Persons 15-49 Years 
(%) 2003 
Estimated Total Number of 
Orphans (0-17 Years)  
as result of HIV/AIDS 
 
2003 
 
Côte d’Ivoire  
 
7.0  
 
310,000 
Ethiopia   4.4 720,000 
Ghana   3.1 170,000 
Kenya  6.7 650,000 
Lesotho  28.9 100,000 
Malawi  14.2 500,000 
Mozambique  12.2 470,000 
South Africa   21.5 1,100,000 
Swaziland  38.8 65,000 
Uganda  4.1 940,000 
United Republic of 
Tanzania  
 
8.8 
 
980,000 
Zambia  16.5 630.000 
Total 
(Sub-Saharan Africa, 
 35 Countries,  
Weighted ) 
 
 
 
7.7 
 
 
 
 
12,016,300 
Total (Asia, 5 countries) 0.4 
 
2,053,000 
Source: ILO, 2004: 88-9 
 
In most Sub-Saharan African countries, a high proportion (about half) of all orphans 
is currently in the age-group 10-14 years. Therefore, large numbers of orphaned 
children may confidently be expected to enter labour markets in the next few years. 
The quality of these new entrants, the degree to which their orphan status will directly 
                                                 
18 This estimate is obviously much smaller than the available estimates for the total number of orphans. 
These estimates vary from 35 million to 47 million depending on the age range of the children included 
(Grassley and Timaeus, 2003). The causal processes determining the total number of orphans – 
conflict, natural disaster, maternal death, malaria etc. and AIDS, are complex and interact with one 
another. 
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have compromised their health, nutrition and levels of education, is a key policy issue. 
This is discussed below (Section 3.2), after examining the more general question of 
the scale of projected increases in the supply of youth to the labour market. 
 
2.5 The Impact of HIV/AIDS on the Labour Supply of Youth 
 
The relatively high proportion of young people in the working age population of all 
Sub-Saharan African economies compared to other developing regions has already 
been noted (Table 3), as have the important differences in age-composition across 
African economies. Fertility rates in Sub-Saharan Africa are, in general, declining at a 
slower rate than in other developing regions and the share of youth, (i.e. 15-24 year 
olds), in the total population of working age in the sub-continent is projected to 
remain more or less constant at about 36 percent between 2000 and 2015.  This is a 
very much higher share for youth than, for example, in the South-Eastern Asian 
economies, where the youth share in the total working age population is projected to 
decline significantly by 2015 (Table A2).   
 
Despite the appalling effects of HIV/AIDS mortality on young people and especially 
young females, the increase in the size of the youth labour force in Sub-Saharan 
Africa up to 2015 (28.2 percent) is still projected to be about as great as the increase 
in the adult (25+ years) labour force.  This is in marked contrast to other developing 
regions, where the youth labour force will increase by less than 3 percent, compared 
to an increase of over 26 percent in the adult labour force (Table A2). Figure 2 
provides a graphic illustration of the historic growth in the difference between the 
share of young people in the population of Africa and the share of young people in the 
populations of other developing regions. 
 
Figure 2: Median Age of the population in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
 
 
Source: Berthélemy, 2004: 25 
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The slow rate of increase in the labour supply of youth in some non-African 
developing regions is not only attributable to more rapidly declining fertility trends, 
but also to the fact that more youths are staying in education for longer (ILO, 2004b: 
6).  Therefore, in the Sub-Saharan African context, there is scope for policies to 
reduce the very rapid rate of growth in the number of new young entrants into the 
labour market.  In the short- to medium-term, a reduction in primary school dropout 
rates and an increase in the transition rate from earlier to later levels of the education 
system are the recommended supply reducing policies.  These policies are much more 
likely to be efficient in improving the quality of youth labour supplies than attempts to 
“keep young people off the streets” by offering training of various kinds for those 
who have already left school (Godfrey, 2003: 18). (Some of the inefficiencies of 
expenditures on youth training, as well as the pro-rich bias of other policies aimed at 
improving the quality of young labour market entrants, will be discussed in Section 
4.4 below).   
 
2.6 Summary and Conclusions   
 
The starting point for analysing labour supply in Sub-Saharan Africa is that there are 
gaping holes in the available data and that published estimates of different 
international agencies sometimes conflict. A large number of countries in the region 
have no reliable information on labour supply. Moreover, the data on countries that 
are covered by Labour Force Surveys and Population Censuses are often based on 
estimates and projections relying on guesstimates about population dynamics and the 
distribution of the labour force by sector, occupation and status. In addition, there is 
remarkably little good quality information that would make possible an accurate 
monitoring of levels and trends in national HIV prevalence rates. The intersection of 
inadequate HIV data collection and widespread shortcomings in broader demographic 
data mean that policy makers are limited in their ability to understand accurately and 
effectively respond to labour supply issues in the region. 
 
Nonetheless, Section 2 has pieced together a coherent analytical story about the 
quantity dimension of labour supply in Sub-Saharan Africa. The overriding theme of 
this analysis is the striking inequalities in labour supply characteristics, both between 
countries and, in some ways even more importantly, within countries. This section 
concentrates particularly on inter-country variations, while later sections focus more 
sharply on intra-country inequalities.  
 
The size of populations varies enormously and there are significant differences in the 
projected growth rates of these populations. The current age structure of the 
population, and hence the proportion of the population of working age, also varies 
significantly from country to country. Thus the median age of Ugandans, in 2000, was 
estimated at 15.1 years, compared to 18.8 years in Ghana and 22.6 years in South 
Africa. While only 12 percent of Uganda’s population was urban in 2003, 62 percent 
of Mauritanians lived in urban areas; and the urban population is projected to grow 
more rapidly in some countries (Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, and Tanzania) than in 
others (Cote d’Ivoire, South Africa, and Zambia).  
 
HIV/AIDS will continue to have a profound, though varying, effect on many African 
countries. The direct impact is especially great on girls and women. Throughout Sub-
Saharan Africa young women (aged 15-24) are twice as likely as young men to be 
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living with HIV/AIDs, though in South Africa they are estimated to be three times 
more likely than young men to be infected. Especially in countries, and areas of 
countries, with very high prevalence, HIV/AIDS has complex implications not just for 
the age composition of the female labour force but also for wider and inter-
generational implications for the quantity and quality of labour supplies. Meanwhile, 
it is extremely difficult, given presently available evidence, accurately to assess and 
predict the impact of HIV/AIDS on child labour supplies. It is also difficult to extract 
this impact from the varying ‘background’ child mortality in uninfected children.  
 
The proportion of children who work, as a percentage of the age cohort, does seem to 
vary considerably between countries, which may suggest some scope for government 
policies to reduce the incidence of child labour. To some extent, children’s labour 
market participation is influenced by levels of poverty; however, there are other 
family characteristics that influence child labour supplies, and these sometimes appear 
stronger than income levels. Furthermore, there are dramatic differences between 
countries in the percentage of the relevant age group that is orphaned (e.g. less than 6 
percent in Ghana but more than 12 percent in Uganda and Mozambique) as well as in 
the absolute numbers of orphans. 
 
There is a relatively high proportion of young people in the working age population of 
all Sub-Saharan African countries, compared to other developing regions; this 
proportion is expected to remain fairly constant between 2000 and 2015, while it is 
projected to decline, e.g., in South-Eastern Asia. Differences in fertility rates clearly 
affect this phenomenon. However, it is also affected by the fact that more youths stay 
in education longer in other developing regions. Therefore, education policies may be 
effective in counteracting the effect of the relatively slow decline in fertility rates in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. These policies would need to focus on reducing primary school 
dropout rates and increasing the transition from lower to higher levels of education.  
 
   
3. The Quality of Labour in the Future: Nutrition, Health, and Educational 
Status 
 
3.1 Cross-Country Comparative Data: Life Expectancy, Literacy, Nutrition 
and Mortality 
 
At the most basic level, since productivity is partly determined by years of experience 
in work, relatively short working lives, or a small share of older people in the 
population aged 15-64 years (see Table 3), mean that low levels of life expectancy are 
likely to have directly adverse effects on labour productivity. Moreover, life 
expectancy may also be considered a good proxy for several other aspects of 
individuals' welfare that will influence their capacity to work productively, including 
their nutritional status and morbidity, etc (McGillivray and White, 1993). It is, 
therefore, important to emphasise the scale of differences in life expectancy between 
countries, and to note trends in cross-country differences in the size of the gender gap 
in life expectancy, since this gap is likely to have important effects on the quality of 
future labour supplies.  Similar arguments apply to differences in literacy rates across 
countries and to differences between countries in the size of the gender literacy gap, 
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although the data on literacy is generally considered to be less robust and comparable 
than the data on life expectancy.19
 
Table 7 provides UN Population Division life expectancy estimates for two periods, 
2000-2005 and 2010-2015.  In the first period, the range of female life expectancy 
across African countries is huge - from about 30 years to about 60 years - and females 
can expect to live 4- 5 years longer than males in some countries, while in others their 
life expectancy is about the same as that of males. By the second period these 
significant differences between countries are projected to increase.  For example, 
female life expectancy in Ghana will be more than 33 years longer than in Swaziland 
and female life expectancy will have fallen below that of males in several countries.   
 
These differences between countries may be explained, in part, by the differential 
prevalence and stages of HIV/AIDS (as discussed in Section 2, above), but there are 
other indicators of women's status that also vary dramatically between countries and 
are not closely correlated with national HIV/AIDS statistics.  For example, over half 
of young women were illiterate in Ethiopia, Mauritania, Senegal and Mozambique in 
2000, while less than 15 percent of young women were illiterate in Ghana, Kenya, 
Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia (Table 7).  Some countries 
already had small or no gaps between the illiteracy rates of young females and males 
in 2000, but others had very large gender gaps (of the order of 29 percentage points in 
2000) and the gaps will still be large (between 10 and 17 percentage points) in 
Mozambique, Malawi, Senegal and Mauritania by 2015.20   
 
It is safe to predict that the children of illiterate mothers will face relatively high risks 
of undernutrition, morbidity and inadequate schooling; they will enrol later, leave at 
an earlier age, and perform relatively poorly in educational attainment tests 
(Morrisson, 2002: 10; Filmer, 2003) and, as a consequence, their labour productivity 
will be low.  Thus, the quality of the future supply of labour in six countries where 
between a quarter and half of young women remain illiterate in 2015 is likely to be 
very inferior to that in the other eight countries listed in Table 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
19 Most of the available data is based on reported rather than tested literacy and in some cases are 
derived from other proxy information.  Moreover, definitions are not necessarily standardized. And the 
field experience of the authors of this paper suggests that it is difficult to discern the value of a 
particular school grade across very different education systems. In some countries, attending the first 2-
3 years of primary school may be sufficient to acquire literacy and numeracy skills, while in other 
countries or in other periods, pupils in higher grades cannot be regarded as literate. Furthermore, in 
some countries, particularly in the Sahel, informal systems of schooling, based on different types of 
Koranic and Franco-Arab schools, are frequently ignored in the official statistics, which may result in 
underestimation of effective literacy (in Arabic). 
20 The impact of gender gaps in educational attainment on economic growth and on other variables, 
including male life expectancy, is discussed in King and Hill, 1993: Chapter 3. 
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Table 7: Estimated and Projected Life Expectancy at Birth and Youth Illiteracy 
Rates, By Gender 
 
 Life Expectancy at Birth 
(Medium Variant) 
2000-2005* 
Life Expectancy at Birth 
(Medium Variant) 
2010-2015* 
Illiteracy Rate (%) 
15-24 Years Old** 
2000 
Illiteracy Rate (%) 
15-24  
Years Old** 
2015 
  
Female
 
Male
 
Female
 
Male
 
Female
 
Male
 
Female
 
Male
Côte d’Ivoire  41.2 40.8 45.8 45.0 48 29 29 20 
Ethiopia   46.3 44.6 48.8 47.5 51 39 30 26 
Ghana   59.3 56.5 62.9 60.5 11 6 3 3 
Kenya  45.6 43.5 44.9 45.0 6 4 1 2 
Lesotho  37.7 32.3 32.3 32.0 1 17 1 13 
Malawi  37.7 37.3 39.1 40.2 39 19 26 13 
Mauritania 54.1 50.9 58.1 54.9 59 43 50 40 
Mozambique  39.6 36.6 39.5 39.1 54 25 32 15 
Senegal 55.1 50.8 59.1 54.8 58 40 39 28 
South Africa  50.7 45.1 40.5 42.3 9 9 6 6 
Swaziland  35.4 33.3 29.6 31.1 9 10 4 5 
Uganda  46.9 45.4 56.2 53.8 28 15 15 9 
Tanzania 44.1 42.5 47.4 45.6 12 7 4 4 
Zambia  32.1 32.7 34.6 35.9 14 9 7 5 
SSA Total 
(35 Countries,  
Weighted) 
 
 
46.7 
 
44.8 
 
48.0 
 
47.3 
    
Eastern Asia 74.7 69.7 76.5 70.4     
South-central 
Asia 
63.9 62.5 66.9 64.9     
 
*United Nations Population Division (2003); **   http://www.uis.unesco.org (July 2004). 
  
The scale of the difference in predicted outcomes for children born in different Sub-
Saharan African countries is also reflected in comparative data on child nutrition and 
child survival rates (Table 8). Many studies have demonstrated associations between 
undernutrition and growth retardation, impaired mental development and increased 
susceptibility to infectious diseases. In Sub-Saharan Africa, recent work suggests that 
undernutrition and micronutrient deficiencies are causing large numbers of children to 
suffer from malaria, while Vitamin A deficiency, affecting between 28 and 35 percent 
of children in different parts of Africa, is a major cause of blindness (Caufield et al: 
2004).  In addition, micro-level evidence demonstrates a significant relationship 
between preschooler nutritional status and the number of years of schooling they can 
complete, as well as their labour productivity as adults (Alderman et al, 2003).  Thus, 
the data on the prevalence of undernutrition presented in Table 8 suggest that the 
quality of the future labour force in Ethiopia, where more than half of children under 
five years old suffer from moderate or severe stunting and 16 percent of children are 
severely underweight, will be much lower than the quality of future labour supplies in 
other Sub-Saharan African countries (including Cote D'Ivoire, Ghana, Lesotho, 
Senegal and South Africa), where roughly a quarter or less of children suffer from 
moderate and severe stunting and six percent or less suffer from severe underweight. 
   
The differential risks faced by children are well illustrated in the data on the levels 
and trends in Under-Five Mortality Rates (Table 8). Some countries combine both 
very high levels of Under-Five Mortality and a weak record in reducing this rate over 
the period 1990 to 2002 (Zambia, Mauritania). Others have quite high current rates 
and a disastrous record in terms of reducing Under-Five Mortality Rates (Swaziland, 
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Kenya, and Cote d'Ivoire). In contrast, Malawi and Mozambique have achieved large 
reductions in the Under-Five Mortality Rate since 1990, but still have extremely high 
current rates. Ghana, which currently has an Under-five Mortality Rate that is about 
half that of Mozambique and Zambia, has been successful in reducing its rate (by 21 
percent since 1990). These results confirm the heterogeneity of Sub-Saharan African 
countries in terms of their current ability to ensure child survival and their recent 
record in achieving improvements in child survival.21 They also provide another clear, 
policy relevant indication of those countries where the quality of the current female 
labour force is likely to be particularly low, since maternal undernutrition and 
illiteracy are strongly associated with high rates of child mortality. 
 
Table 8: Under-Five Malnutrition, Mortality and Reductions in Mortality Rates 
 
 
 
 
% of Under-Fives 
(1995-2002) 
Suffering From 
Under-5 
Mortality 
Rate 
(2002) 
  
 Underweight 
(Severe) 
Stunting 
(Moderate 
and Severe) 
 
 
Average Annual  
Rate of Reduction   
1990-2002 (%) 
Reduction 
Since 1990 
(%) 
Côte d’Ivoire  5 25 176 -1.1 -14 
Ethiopia   16 52 171 1.5 16 
Ghana   5 26 100 1.9 21 
Kenya  6 35 122 -1.9 -26 
Lesotho  3 12 87 2.7 28 
Malawi  6 49 183 2.3 24 
Mauritania 10 35 183 0.0 0 
Mozambique  - 44 197 1.5 16 
Senegal 6 25 138 0.6 7 
South Africa   2 25 65 -0.7 -8 
Swaziland  2 30 149 -2.5 -35 
Uganda  5 39 141 1.1 12 
United Republic of 
Tanzania  
7 44 165 -0.1 -1 
Zambia  7 47 192 -0.1 -2 
Total 
 (Sub-Saharan Africa, 
 35 Countries, Weighted ) 
8 38 174 0.3 3 
South Asia 
 
17 44 97 2.3 24 
Source: UNICEF, Basic Indicators 2004 ( http://www.unicef.org/sowc04/sowc04_tables.html) 
  
Sub-Saharan Africa's development experience since 1945 is often unfavourably 
compared with the development performance of certain East Asian and Latin 
American developing economies.  Such comparisons too often ignore the fact that, for 
example, 80 percent of adult females were already literate in Chile by the early 1950s, 
more than 50 percent were literate in Mexico and the Philippines, and over a third 
were literate in Thailand.  They also ignore the fact that, in 1960, the average level of 
schooling of the working age population was only 1.3 years in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
compared to 3.8 years in Latin America and the Caribbean and 2.3 years in East Asia 
and Pacific (OECD New Database, 2002:12).22 Thus, the starting points for 
improvements in human development and labour productivity were by no means 
                                                 
21 Econometric work on the determinants of the capacity of different Sub-Saharan African countries to 
reduce under-five mortality is noted below in Section 4.3. 
22 Although the annual average growth rate of schooling between 1960 and 2000 was slightly faster in 
SSA than in East Asia and Pacific (2.7% vs. 2.6%), average schooling in SSA by 2000 was only 3.9 
years, compared to 6.4 years in EAP (ibid).  
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comparable, suggesting that considerable caution should be applied before assuming 
that all Sub-Saharan economies should or could have replicated some of the post-war 
successes of the NICs (Sender, 1999: 92; Platteau, 1996).  
 
 
3.2 Intra-Country Differentials in Education and Health Status 
 
If appropriate policies are to be developed, it is not sufficient to highlight enduring 
disparities in the growth rates of labour supply and in the quality of labour available 
in different Sub-Saharan economies.  It is also necessary to emphasise the degree of 
differentiation within each of these economies. A focus on inter-country differences 
may avoid the dangers of crude Africa-wide policy prescriptions to improve the 
quality of labour supply. It might also support arguments for reallocating Official 
Development Assistance towards particularly vulnerable countries in Africa, ending 
the trend bias in the 1990s away from the poorest countries (White, 2002: 12).  
However, inequalities in the intra-country distribution of education, health, sanitation 
and other services mean that the labour supply from some regions, districts or 
households will continue to exhibit very different capacities to work productively.   
 
There has been a great deal of recent research comparing the relative degree of 
inequality in the health and education of the populations of countries in SSA.  This 
research, based on comparable DHS data, confirms the persistence of substantial 
variation in, e.g., the extent of the urban-rural divide in standards of living.  Thus, 
although living standards in rural areas of SSA generally lag far behind those in urban 
areas, the size of the lag is very much greater in some countries than others.  
However, focusing on rural education/health standards would not be sufficient to 
reduce national inequalities, since most of the inequality in these countries is 
comprised of inequalities within rural and urban areas (Sahn and Stifel, 2004).  
 
Inequalities in several indicators of human welfare are far greater in rural than in 
urban areas. For example, the Theil index of education inequality, based on 
attainment data (i.e. the ultimate year of schooling for the population of working 
age23), is much higher in the rural than the urban areas of all countries in Table 9.24   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Here defined as people 15 to 40 years old.  
24 The Theil measure is used because it is decomposable into groups, i.e. it can be decomposed into the 
sum of within and between region (urban or rural) contributions to inequality, to indicate the degree to 
which a reduction in inequality between rural and urban areas would reduce overall inequality.  This 
measure is the basis for the conclusion that the contribution of inequality within rural regions 
predominates in Sub-Saharan Africa (ibid: 22). 
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Table 9: Inequalities in Educational Attainment 
   
Country:  
(date of DHS) 
Percentage Without Any School 
  
Theil Inequality Measures 
 
 National Rural Urban Gini National Rural Urban 
Cote d'Ivoire 
(1994)  48 57.3 36 0.622 0.777 0.978 0.553 
Ghana 
 (1998)  21.1 26.9 11.1 0.378 0.318 0.397 0.185 
Kenya 
 (1998)  6.3 7 4.3 0.253 0.135 0.142 0.096 
Malawi  
(1992) 33.2 36.6 14.3 0.522 0.537 0.587 0.245 
Mozambique 
(1997)  33.5 40.8 13.5 0.547 0.582 0.686 0.264 
Senegal 
  (1992)  64.3 83.9 38.4 0.796 1.551 2.654 0.871 
Tanzania 
  (1999)  18.2 21.8 8.7 0.305 0.265 0.303 0.163 
Uganda 
 (1995)  22.2 24.8 8.1 0.431 0.37 0.399 0.168 
Zambia 
 (1996) 9.7 15.2 3.1 0.305 0.193 0.259 0.097 
Source: Sahn and Stifel, (2004, 24) 
 
Table 9 shows that rural inequality in education attainment is generally high, but far 
greater in some countries than in others.  For example, the rural Theil index for 
Senegal is 2.654, compared to a rural Theil index of 0.142 for Kenya.  Similarly, 
indicators of the health status of rural and urban populations show significant 
variations in the size of rural-urban gaps. Theil indices confirm that rural inequality in 
health is far worse in some countries than in others (Table 10).25  For example the 
rural Theil index for health inequality is 1.7229 in Kenya and only 1.012 in Tanzania. 
 
Table 10: Rural and Urban Health Inequality 
 
Country 
 (and DHS Date) 
Gini Theil Measure 
 (NCHS 
Adjusted) 
Rural Theil Measure 
 (NCHS Adjusted) 
Urban Theil Measure 
 (NCHS Adjusted) 
     
Cote d'Ivoire (1994)  0.034 1.241 1.4337 0.7108 
Ghana (1998) 0.0331 1.0964 1.1325 0.8554 
Kenya (1998)  0.0379 1.759 1.7229 1.6867 
Malawi (1992)  0.0356 1.4337 1.4096 1.2048 
Mozambique (1997)  0.0383 1.8072 1.9036 1.4096 
Senegal (1992)  0.0339 1.2169 1.3373 0.8193 
Tanzania (1999)  0.032 0.9639 1.012 0.4578 
Uganda (1995)  0.0346 1.3735 1.3976 1 
Zambia (1996)  0.0355 1.4217 1.5904 1 
 
Source: Sahn and Stifel, (2004;, 25) 
 
 
                                                 
25 Sahn and Stifel measure inequality in health by the inequality in linear growth of children, since they 
argue that child height is a useful indicator of well-being.  They assess the degree to which inequality 
of heights in the DHS samples, conditional on gender and age, differs from the inequality observed in 
the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) healthy reference population (2004:13).  
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The data contained in Tables 9 and 10, showing large disparities between countries in 
measures of health and educational status, as well as very different patterns and 
degrees of inequality, derive from research that does not attempt to analyse 
correlations between education/health status and income or other indicators of social 
stratification.  However, the gaps between the health and educational status of poor 
and better-off households in Sub-Saharan Africa are very substantial and the 
asset/expenditure levels of African households do appear to be a good, if not perfect, 
predictor of the health and educational status of household members (Houweling et 
al., 2003; Gwatkin and Rutstein, 2000; Filmer and Pritchett, 2001). The evidence (see 
Table A4) indicates an almost complete lack of basic educational opportunities for 
poor girls in Ethiopia, Senegal, Mozambique and Cote D’Ivoire.  Poor girls are 
significantly more likely achieve a basic education in Ghana, Malawi, Zambia and 
Tanzania, but only Kenya and South Africa have achieved nearly universal grade four 
attainment for both girls and boys (Figure 3). One clear implication is that the 
prospects for the supply of educated and productive labour, including the domestic 
labour of women who have the capacity to improve the nutritional status of their 
children, differ a great deal between different types of households in each Sub-
Saharan African economy. 
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Figure 3 
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The case for a policy focus on improving the quality of labour supplied by the poorest 
rural households is reinforced when the growing problem of orphaned children 
(highlighted in 2.4 above) is considered.  This is because orphaned children, on 
average, live in poorer households than non-orphans (and are more likely to live in 
households headed by females or less educated men).  Although the low levels of 
education achieved by orphans is not solely due to their relative poverty (Case et al, 
2002, 3; 22; 29-30), research based on longitudinal survey results stresses that 
parental deaths have very different impacts across socio-economic groups (Evans and 
Miguel, 2004: 18).  It is clear that orphans living in poor households are likely to 
receive significantly less education than other children.  Therefore, when these 
children do enter the labour market, their lack of basic literacy and numeracy is likely 
to confine them within poorly remunerated segments of the market. At present, about 
90 percent of orphans are of school going age and there is a strong case for urgent 
policy initiatives aimed at keeping all orphans, but particularly those living in the 
poorest households, at school. Policy interventions in Botswana, including the 
provision of meals at school, seem to have had a significant impact on school 
absenteeism rates for orphans, which are much lower than in Malawi and Uganda 
(United Nations, 2004c: 72). 
   
Another category of children, apart from those whose parent(s) have died, are also 
likely to complete few years of schooling and to enter poorly remunerated forms of 
employment. These are the children of women who become pregnant as teenagers, 
who are at risk partly because their mothers will have had so little success in the 
labour market (Sender, 2002; Sender et al, 2004).  Table 11 shows that both teenage 
pregnancy and child stunting are much more likely to occur in the poorest quintile of 
households than in the richest, in all of the selected Sub-Saharan countries for which 
data are available.  This Table also indicates that the labour productivity of women 
aged 15 to 49 years in the poorest quintile is likely to be much lower than that of 
women in the richest quintile; partly they are more likely to be malnourished, i.e. to 
have a Body Mass Index of less than 18.5.  There is also evidence to suggest that high 
total fertility rates have adverse consequences for women's labour market 
performance, limiting women's mobility in labour markets, the total number of years 
of work experience they can gain and, therefore, their wages (Sender, 2003:37; Joshi 
et al, 1999:556). Table 14 shows that, in some countries, women in the poorest 
quintile of households have total fertility rates well over twice as high as those of 
women in the richest quintile. The poorest women are also likely to run higher risks of 
neo-natal mortality: they are far less likely than women in richer households to get 
adequate antenatal care or have births attended by medically trained personnel (Table 
12). It has been suggested that African children whose mothers received antenatal 
care are generally healthier (taller) and do better at school (Morrisson, 2002: 9).  
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Table 11:  Selected Indicators of Fertility and Health for Women and Children 
in the Richest and Poorest Households  
 
Country Percentage of Women 
 Aged 15-19  
Giving Birth 
 in One Year 
Percentage of 
Children 
Moderately and 
Severely 
 Stunted 
Percentage of  
Malnourished 
Women 
Total Fertility Rate 
(Lifetime Births 
per Women) 
 Poorest 
 Fifth 
Richest 
 Fifth 
Poorest 
 Fifth 
Richest 
 Fifth 
Poorest 
 Fifth 
Richest 
Fifth 
Poorest 
 Fifth 
Richest 
Fifth 
Cote D'Ivoire 19 7 34 13 11 6 6.4 3.7 
Ethiopia 8 7 53 43 32 25 6.3 3.6 
Ghana 13 2 35 10 18 5 6.3 2.4 
Kenya 16 6 44 17 18 6 6.5 3.0 
Malawi 19 14 58 34 10 6 7.1 4.8 
Mauritania 9 5 39 23 17 9 5.4 3.5 
Mozambique 19 13 48 22 17 4 5.2 4.4 
Senegal 15 4 .. .. .. .. 7.4 3.6 
South Africa 11 2 .. .. .. .. 4.8 1.9 
Tanzania 20 8 50 23 12** 7** 7.8 3.4 
Uganda 23 11 43 25 15 5 8.5 4.1 
Zambia 19 9 54 32 9 4 7.3 3.6 
 
Source: Population Reference Bureau, 2004:2. 
**1995-7 DHS (other Tanzanian data from 1999). 
 
 
 
Table 12: Ante- and Neo-Natal Health Care in the Poorest and Richest 
Households 
 
Country Percentage of Women 
with 3+ 
Antenatal Care Visits 
Percentage of Births Attended by 
Medically Trained Personnel 
 Poorest 
 Fifth 
Richest 
 Fifth 
Poorest 
 Fifth 
Richest 
 Fifth 
Cote D'Ivoire 26 75 17 84 
Ethiopia 7 45 1 25 
Ghana 59 91 18 86 
Kenya 77 87 23 80 
Malawi 77 86 43 83 
Mauritania 16 75 15 93 
Mozambique 30 75 18 82 
Senegal 44 84 20 86 
South Africa 78 90 68 98 
Tanzania 82 93 29 83 
Uganda 59 86 20 77 
Zambia 80 92 20 91 
 
Source: Population Reference Bureau, 2004:2. 
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3.3 Summary and Conclusions 
 
Underpinning the prospects for future development of the quality of the labour supply 
in Sub-Saharan Africa are extraordinary inequalities in the health, education and life 
expectancy of populations in the region. These inequalities have direct implications 
for policy priorities. This section has stressed the scale of differences in life 
expectancy between countries as well as cross-country differences in the degree of a 
gender gap in life expectancy. Furthermore, the range of female life expectancies 
between countries, already striking, is projected to increase so that, e.g., female life 
expectancy in Ghana is likely to be some 33 years longer than in Swaziland by 2015.  
 
The differential impact of HIV/AIDS obviously partly accounts for this trend but 
other factors also help to explain it. Thus, there are substantial variations in literacy 
levels and in literacy gender gaps between countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Female 
illiteracy, which is particularly significant in countries like Ethiopia, Mauritania, 
Senegal and Mozambique and which also lags behind male literacy in these countries, 
is an important constraint on the quality of the future labour supply, given the 
association of illiteracy with high risks of child undernutrition, morbidity, and 
inadequate schooling. Levels of undernutrition, affecting health, schooling, and later 
productivity, also vary across countries. In Ethiopia, more than half of children under 
five years old suffer from moderate or severe stunting, compared to a quarter or less 
of children in this age group in countries like Ghana, Senegal and South Africa. 
Similarly, not only are there different levels of under-five mortality in different SSA 
countries, but also some countries have sharply reduced this level in recent years 
while others have experienced increases in under-five mortality rates.  
 
These trends suggest very strongly the need to avoid Africa-wide policy prescriptions 
and to reallocate aid flows towards especially vulnerable countries. However, policy 
design also has to address the substantial inequalities within countries in the 
distribution of education, health and other services. The degree of inequality in 
education attainment, for example, is much higher within rural than urban areas of all 
countries in our sample. This rural education inequality is also much sharper in some 
countries – e.g. Senegal – than in others. There is an almost complete lack of 
education opportunities for poor girls in countries like Ethiopia, Senegal, 
Mozambique, and Cote d’Ivoire, though in some countries poorer girls are more likely 
to get a basic education. Much the same is true of the distribution of health services. 
 
There is thus a strong case for prioritising resource allocations towards tackling the 
health and education provision for the poorest rural people. There is also an urgent 
need to implement policy initiatives to keep children and orphans, especially those 
living in poorer households, in school. Meanwhile, evidence of the poor health and 
education status of children of women who become pregnant as teenagers suggests 
another focus for policy initiatives, to overcome inter-generational traps of poverty 
and low productivity.  
 
A further implication of the trends highlighted in this section is that effective policy 
design for improving the prospects of labour supply quality will require more focused 
empirical research, based on purposive sampling of the poorest quintile of the 
population. This point is taken up in Section 6.2, below. 
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4. Improving the Quality of Labour Supply: Constraints and Policy 
Opportunities 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The quality of labour supplied in each Sub-Saharan African economy will be 
influenced by the capacity to educate and to improve the health and skills of the next 
generation of workers. This Section will discuss these three aspects of labour quality, 
beginning with a discussion of capacity constraints in the education sector. However, 
it is important first to emphasise the shortcomings of the available data on schooling. 
Net enrolment rates are seldom available, precisely because school dropout and 
repetition rates are inaccurately recorded in many Sub-Saharan Africa countries 
(OECD New Human Capital Database, 2002; Behrman and Rosenzweig, 1994). If 
estimates of schooling are not adequate to characterise the quality of the labour force, 
alternative indicators are also difficult to come by. Reliable and disaggregated 
information on years of labour experience, probably an extremely important 
dimension of labour force quality, are rarely available. Data on training in the 
workplace are often missing in the available datasets. Firm and establishment surveys, 
almost the only data sources for this information (Recanatini et al, 2002), contain 
rather weak modules on employment and the quality of the labour force.26  
 
The quality of African labour in the future will also depend on how the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic affects the skill composition of the labour force. There is some evidence that 
HIV/AIDS prevalence rates differ substantially across skill groups in the labour force 
and that the epidemic will have a differential impact on labour force growth by skill 
category.  For example, in Southern Africa there appears to be an inverse relationship 
between HIV prevalence and skill class, with unskilled and semi-skilled workers 
having a much higher prevalence than their skilled, highly skilled or managerial 
counterparts.27  Tracer studies comparing the mortality of university with secondary 
school leavers in Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi and Zimbabwe in the 1990s find that a 
very much higher percentage of the less educated secondary school graduates had 
died, many of them, presumably, from AIDS-related illness (Al-Samarrai and 
Bennell, 2003: 27). Given the current skill composition of the labour force, projected 
labour supply losses at lower skill levels far exceed losses at higher skill levels, 
although the epidemic is also anticipated to exacerbate skills shortages in the region.   
 
However, the empirical basis for these projections remains extremely weak (Bennell, 
2003).  For example, the available estimates of HIV prevalence across industries do 
not provide reliable estimates of prevalence in the economy, since the samples are not 
representative of the industries or sectors concerned and, besides, estimates vary 
dramatically, even for the same types of companies in the same sectors.  Prevalence 
estimates for mining companies in South Africa range from 5.5 percent to 29.5 
percent and, for non-mining companies, from 0.2 percent to 21.5 percent (Booysen et 
al, 2003: 12). When public or private sector organisations in South Africa do provide 
data on HIV prevalence rates amongst their employees, they “limit information to 
                                                 
26 The ILO’s Enterprise Labour Flexibility and Security Survey instrument is an exception, but has 
only been applied in surveys in two African economies - South Africa and Tanzania (ILO, 2004c). 
27 Not all surveys confirm this relationship: e.g. in a Zambian survey prevalence amongst skilled 
workers was 26 percent, compared to 18 percent for unskilled/contract workers (ILO, 2004a: 17). 
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aggregate HIV/Aids prevalence rates with little or no information about the 
demographic, skills and occupational distribution of HIV/AIDS” (Vass, 2002: 6). 
    
It is not possible to relate any national prevalence data to important socio-economic 
status indicators, including indicators of employment status, job categories, sectors of 
employment, levels of education, training and work experience (Booysen et al 
2003:11).  In part, this difficulty arises because of a more general problem with labour 
force surveys that only collect limited information on the work performed by the 
population of working age throughout the year, before lumping them into pre-
determined, crudely dichotomous categories and sectors, i.e. economically (in)active, 
(un)employed, (in)formal,  primary and secondary employment, etc. (see Section 6.1 
below). However, it is not possible to relate even these flawed labour force data to 
national statistics on HIV prevalence.   
 
The problem is exacerbated because DHS questionnaires fail to collect sufficient 
information on the types of work done by sero-positive and negative household 
members in different socio-economic strata. As a result the precise impact of 
HIV/AIDS on the quality of the labour force, especially on those working in the very 
large, unenumerated sector in African economies, is poorly understood.  
 
4.2 Teachers and Conditional Cash Transfers for Schooling 
 
The education required by new entrants to the labour force, according to potential 
employers, is the basic literacy and numeracy essential for rapidly acquiring the skills 
to do their jobs (Godfrey, 2003: 13).  The capacity to provide such education in 
schools will depend, in part, on the local severity of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  
However, it also depends on the policies implemented by individual countries, 
including the history and pattern of their investment in education and health since 
1945, as well as upon the outcome of investment efforts in more recent decades, 
reflected in Tables 7-12.  Obviously, past policies and current capacity vary widely 
between countries. 
 
In most Sub-Saharan countries, the school age population is projected to continue to 
grow up to 2010 despite the effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (United Nations, 
2004c: Chapter VI).  The quantitative output of schools in most countries depends, 
therefore, on enrolment and completion rates, which may be affected by several 
factors, including the available supply of teachers.  If HIV/AIDS results in the death, 
illness and absenteeism of increasing numbers of teachers, (and reduces the effective 
numbers of education sector administrators, planning and finance officials, etc.), then 
the quality of schools’ output will also be affected. However, there is no reliable 
evidence to suggest that prevalence is particularly high amongst school teachers, 
although it does appear to be significantly higher among primary school teachers than 
among teachers in secondary schools (Bennell, 2003b: 16). 
 
In fact, there is little comparable cross-country evidence on reductions in teacher 
supply attributable to HIV/AIDS mortality and morbidity.  A Zambian study 
suggested that the number of teacher deaths in 1998 was equivalent to the loss of 
about two thirds of the annual output of newly trained teachers.  In Malawi, about 10 
percent of education personnel in urban areas were estimated to have died of AIDS by 
1997, and it was projected that this figure would rise to 40 percent by 2005.  In 
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KwaZulu-Natal, an area with even higher prevalence rates, mortality among teachers 
increased very rapidly between 1997 and 2001 in a sample covering 100 schools 
(United Nations, 2004c: 71).  In this Province, it has been estimated that, out of the 
current cohort of 75,000, no less than 65,000 teachers will have been lost by 2010, as 
a result of emigration, natural (non-AIDS) attrition and AIDS mortality (Whiteside, 
2003: 27). However, it has also been argued that the trend in teacher mortality is 
downwards and not upwards in a number of countries, including Botswana, Uganda 
and Zambia and that, "projected morbidity and absenteeism rates for teachers are little 
more than inspired guesses" (Bennell, 2003b:8).28
 
The ability to maintain or expand the supply of teachers in rural areas will depend, in 
part, on teacher training capacity. It may be assumed that the underlying capacity to 
expand the supply of skilled personnel to the education sector (and to other key 
sectors, including health and technical skills provision) is limited in those countries 
that have relatively low numbers of students enrolled in the tertiary sector.  Table 13 
provides some information on the numbers enrolled in the Tertiary Sector.  Tertiary 
enrolment, as a percentage of the relevant age group, is especially low in Tanzania, 
Mozambique, Malawi and Ethiopia.   
 
However, the annual average rate of growth of tertiary enrolments, where the data 
allow this to be calculated, appears to have been rather rapid in several Sub-Saharan 
African countries, including those countries starting from a very low capacity base: 
e.g., 16.9 percent in Tanzania, 12.5 percent in Mozambique and nearly 10 percent in 
Ethiopia in the years after 1993; and over an earlier period (1985-1990) 11.3 percent 
in Malawi (http://www.adeanet.org).  In Zambia, teacher-training capacity was 
increased dramatically from less than 2,000 to nearly 6,000 in the late 1990s (Bennell, 
2003b: 38). These growth rates suggest that there is scope for policy interventions to 
achieve quite rapid responses to inadequate capacity, or to AIDS-related declines in 
the numbers of teachers and other key personnel with post-secondary education.   
 
Table 13: Tertiary Enrolment and Gross Enrolment Ratios,  
(Most Recent Data) 
 
 
Total Tertiary 
Enrolment 
(Thousands, Latest 
Available Year) 
Gross Enrolment in Tertiary 
Education as Percentage of the 
Age Group 
Cote d'Ivoire 55 (1994) 4.5 
Ethiopia 32.7 (1994) 0.7 
Ghana 19 (1990) 1.4 
Kenya 33.5 (1990) 1.6 
Lesotho 4.6 (1996) 2.4 
Malawi 5.6 (1995) 0.6 
Mauritania 8.5 (1995) 3.9 
Mozambique 7.1 (1996) 0.5 
Senegal 24.1 (1994) 3.4 
South Africa 690 (1995) 15.9 
Swaziland 5.7 (1996) 6.0 
Tanzania 12.28 (1995) 0.5 
                                                 
28 Similar uncertainties affect published estimates of the mortality and morbidity of skilled health sector 
workers. 
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Uganda 34.8 (1996) 1.7 
Zambia 19 (1994) 2.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa           2,017 (1996)  
 
Source: Association for the Development of Education in Africa, 2004: http://www.adeanet.org 
 
Other policy interventions may be effective in improving the poorest children’s access 
to education, or reducing the impact of declines in teacher numbers due to HIV/AIDS.  
Rural schools typically have high levels of staff turnover and attrition, as well as high 
pupil: teacher ratios, for reasons that have little to do with HIV/AIDS.   On aggregate, 
teacher supplies may be quite high at the national level, but the distribution of 
teachers to particular types of school can be influenced by promotion structures, 
salaries and other incentives. More important, the ability of the poorest rural children 
to complete primary schooling has been shown to be determined less by supply side 
factors than by the demand side, especially the socio-economic characteristics of the 
households in which these children live.  In Mozambique, for example, "Policy 
simulations comparing the impact of different policy interventions on rural primary 
school enrolment rates reveal that changes in demand-side (for example, household 
characteristics) dominate supply-side factors in their impact on children’s schooling" 
(Handa et al, 2004: xi).   
 
The most cost-effective policy intervention in these simulations was to invest in 
female adult literacy campaigns in rural areas, since having a literate mother greatly 
increases the probability that a poor rural child will attend school.  However, 
household incomes also influence children's educational attainment and it should be 
possible to replicate the success of policies in other developing countries that provide 
a monthly income payment to mothers on condition that their children go to school.  
The relevant policies include the Bolsa Escola in Brazil, PROGRESA (recently 
renamed Oportunidades) in Mexico, and others in Bangladesh, Columbia, Nicaragua, 
Honduras and Jamaica (ILO, 2004d: 382-4).  The relevance of policies targeting such 
conditional transfers on the poorest African rural women has recently been accepted 
by the World Bank, which also now recognizes the scope to improve the educational 
attainment of the poorest rural labour market entrants through much greater efforts to 
eliminate user fees in primary education.  These fees are still widespread in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Kattan and Burnett, 2004).29
 
The most systematic review of the evidence suggests that the impact of HIV/AIDS on 
schooling in Sub-Saharan Africa need not be catastrophic, pointing to the example of 
Uganda, a high prevalence country, which was able to introduce universal primary 
education and where secondary enrolments have increased very rapidly since the late 
1990s (Bennell 2003b: 46). There is also other recent evidence of rapid change in the 
provision of schooling. For example, in Malawi, there has been a pronounced pro-
poor shift in the benefit incidence of public spending on education. The share of 
benefits from primary spending accruing to the poorest quintile increased from 15 
                                                 
29 “Poverty targeting measures are required when …the difference in access to services between poor and nonpoor 
is wide. Subsidizing education, waiving the uniform obligation, and supporting the health and nutrition needs of 
the poorest children would contribute to an improvement in the welfare of the neediest [Orphans and Vulnerable 
Children]. In such circumstances, conditional cash transfer programs, with a significant element of self-targeting as 
appropriate, appear promising…” (Subbarao and Coury, 2004: 98). 
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percent in the early 1990s to 25 percent in the late 1990s.  A similar pro-poor shift 
occurred at the secondary education level (Davoodi et al., 2003:26).   
 
4.3 Health Workers  
 
Recent cross-country research suggests that there is a positive relationship between 
health worker density and health outcomes as measured by under-five mortality, 
(which is a reasonable proxy for labour quality and productivity).  The total number 
of physicians, nurses and midwives per population has a positive effect on mortality 
rates over and above the effects of income, education and poverty levels (Anand and 
Baernighausen, 2004), suggesting that efforts to increase the number of health 
workers could make a significant contribution to the health status and the quality of 
labour in the low health worker density countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, 
the total number of health professionals in Sub-Saharan Africa is very low in 
comparison to other developing regions of the world – estimated at only about 
600,000, which translates into a density of about 1 health worker per 1000 people – 
(Joint Learning Initiative, 2004: 29). 
 
Table 14 shows the huge gaps between the health worker densities across SSA. 
Ethiopia and Uganda have densities below 0.25, and Malawi and Mozambique also 
score badly (0.31). In contrast, densities are very much higher in Kenya (1.03), Ghana 
(0.93) and those economies where densities are well over 1.0 and health expenditures 
per capita are also very much higher. Donor expenditures have by no means begun to 
redress these imbalances (Joint Learning Initiative, 2004: Table A2.4). In addition, 
they have been uncoordinated. Typically, each donor project has its own different 
priorities and there are overlapping health staff training and incentive sub-systems, 
which usually operate outside government health systems and have undermined 
staffing in state structures and systems (USAID, 2003: 36; Pfeiffer, 2003).  
 
Table 14:  Distribution of Health Personnel in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
                  (2003 or Most Recent Available Data)  
 
Human Resources 
for Health Index1 
 
Density of Physicians 
(per ‘000 Population) 
Density of Nurses and 
Midwives 
(per ‘000 Population) 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.55 0.09 0.46 
Ethiopia 0.23 0.03 0.21 
Ghana 0.93 0.09 0.84 
Kenya 1.03 0.13 0.90 
Lesotho 1.12 0.05 1.07 
Malawi 0.31 0.05 0.26 
Mauritania 0.86 0.14 0.72 
Mozambique 0.31 0.02 0.28 
Senegal 0.36 0.08 0.29 
South Africa 4.57 0.69 3.88 
Swaziland 3.38 0.18 3.20 
Tanzania 0.39 0.02 0.37 
Uganda 0.14 0.05 0.05 
Zambia 1.20 0.07 1.13 
Source: Joint Learning Initiative, 2004: Table A2.1 
 
1.  A measure of health worker density based on the total number of doctors, nurses and midwives per thousand 
population 
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Data on the impact of HIV/AIDS on the supply of health workers is patchy.  
Nevertheless, it has apocalyptically been claimed that, “An entire generation of health 
workers is being lost in the epidemic countries of East and southern Africa” (USAID, 
2003), although it is clear that there are many other causes, apart from premature 
deaths, for the scarcity of health workers relative to population needs. Above all the 
high concentration of health workers in urban and curative facilities, rather than rural 
and preventative services, remains the norm in SSA, as does expenditure on clinical 
training as opposed to more relevant public-health training.   
 
Most of the disease burden affecting the quality of labour in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
accounted for by communicable disease and could effectively be addressed by 
community nurses.  Besides, there is general agreement that it will not be feasible, 
within the next decade, for Africa to achieve a very substantial increase in the number 
of doctors and professional nurses.  Therefore, it is recommended that, “A more 
appropriate strategy would focus on building up cadres of briefly trained and well-
supported auxiliary workers who can perform core basic functions” (Joint Learning 
Initiative, 2004: 73). Yet the emphasis in Africa continues to be on the training of 
degree-level or registered nurses (RN), as opposed to community health or enrolled 
nurses (EN), despite the fact that the professional nurse training programme typically 
costs 30 percent more than the EN programme and takes up to twice as long (USAID, 
2003: 8). One consequence of expenditures on inappropriate and internationally 
transferable skills is the large-scale emigration of health professionals (see Section 
5.3, below).30  More generally, the lack of relevance for the poor of the current pattern 
of health expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa is highlighted by the finding that only 13 
percent of the benefits of public expenditures on health accrue to the poorest quintile 
of households, as opposed to an average of almost 29 percent to the richest quintile.  
Even expenditures on Primary Health Care are poorly targeted, benefiting the richest 
households in Sub-Saharan Africa far more than the poorest (Table 15). 
 
Table 15:  Benefit Incidence of Public Spending on Health in the 1990s 
(Unweighted average; in percent of total spending) 
 
 All1  Primary 
Health 
Care2
 Health 
Centres
 Hospitals  
 Poorest Richest Poorest Richest Poorest Richest Poorest Richest 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa  
12.9 28.6 15.3 22.7 14.5 23.7 12.2 30.9 
Western 
Hemisphere 
23.1 15.2 20.4 19.1 19.1 19.9 17.0 22.2 
 
Source: Davoodi et al, 2003: 25 
1. Includes more than hospitals and health centers. 
2. Refers to one of the following categories: health centers, clinics, child health, and preventive care. 
 
Thus, a focus on meeting the basic health needs of the poorest members of the rural 
labour force would require a major shift in the pattern of both donor and government 
expenditures on health.  Such a shift is unlikely to occur in contexts where the 
bargaining power or “voice” of poorer workers remains weak, relative to the ability of 
                                                 
30 For example, out of the more than 600 doctors trained in Zambia since independence, only 50 remain 
(ibid: 11).   
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an elite of health professionals and their relatively rich urban patients to insist on 
continued state subsidies for high cost facilities. 
 
4.4  Vocational Education, Training and Skills 
 
There is general agreement in the literature that the existing provision of technical and 
vocational education and training (TVET), including training provided by employers 
in the private sector, by NGOs and by the state, does not benefit the poorest members 
of the labour force.  The irrelevance of existing provision for poor rural women and 
youth is particularly striking (Johanson and Adams, 2004: 178-9; Bennell, 1999: 6,19; 
Haan, 2002: 79-81). One review notes that, “the failure of … training institutions to 
reorient their activities in favour of the poor is part of a wider political problem. In 
particular, pro-poor training reforms will invariably threaten powerful vested 
interests” (Bennell, 1999: 41).   
 
This political problem has similarities with the problems (discussed in the previous 
Sub-Section) faced by attempts to re-orientate the training of health professionals. The 
relative bargaining power of the vast majority of young, disadvantaged labour market 
entrants who live in rural areas is weak.  These young people are often scattered and 
dispersed across vast swathes of countryside.  They face high transportation costs and 
these, in turn, make it costly to construct and equip a sufficient number of primary 
schools and to recruit and retain teachers in rural areas.  In contrast, the teenagers and 
young adults living in urban areas constitute a rather powerful and vocal part of the 
population and, in many Sub-Saharan African countries, appear to have a relatively 
significant impact on political processes.  Governments have reason to fear riots by 
secondary school students in the largest cities.  These structural features may be used 
to understand the political economy of the relatively high degree of bias towards 
expenditures on students in the upper levels of secondary schools and in tertiary 
education, as well as training systems that are biased so that, “The principal 
beneficiaries are urban males from relatively well off background who attend training 
institutions in order to acquire qualifications that give them access to high paying … 
jobs in the formal sector” (ibid:19). 
 
Thus, although several African governments are devoting quite a large proportion of 
their budgets to various types of education, they have few resources available to 
improve quality and expand the rural primary school system, because over half of 
total expenditures are allocated to secondary and tertiary education (Berthélemy, 
2004: 24).  The immediate beneficiaries of these expenditures are the children of the 
wealthiest and best educated parents in Africa, as has been shown in research on the 
socio-economic background of recent university and secondary school graduates in 
Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi and Zimbabwe (Al-Samarrai and Bennell, 2003: 22-23).31
 
One rationale for devoting both government and donor resources to politically vocal 
young labour market entrants is the belief that there is a growing crisis of 
unemployment in Sub-Saharan Africa, exacerbated by the lack of appropriate skills 
amongst the young.  Thus, well-publicized efforts have been made to estimate the 
statistics for youth “unemployment” and these are reflected in the Millennium 
Development Goals.  However, these estimates effectively ignore the labour market 
                                                 
31 Both secondary school and university graduates in these surveys appear to spend a considerable 
proportion the time since graduating unemployed and looking for work (ibid: 61).  
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problems of the very large number of disadvantaged young people in rural Sub-
Saharan Africa who simply cannot afford to be “unemployed” in the standard, 
internationally comparable ILO definition of open unemployment.32 There is an 
emerging, if belated, consensus that “unemployment” is only one indicator of labour 
market outcomes for youth and that, in all economies with very large agricultural, 
unenumerated or “informal” sectors, it is usually not the best, or even a particularly 
useful indicator (Betcherman et al, 2004: 34).   
 
Thus, some published data on unemployment in Sub-Saharan Africa make little sense.  
For example, ILO data suggest that "unemployment" rates in 2003 were no less than 
five times higher in Southern than in Western Africa (Table A12), but this surely 
indicates differences in statistical coverage, survey methods and definitions rather 
than real differences in labour market performance and outcomes. Of course, some 
young people in Sub-Saharan Africa are “unemployed” in terms of this standard 
definition, but they tend to be concentrated in urban areas, to have completed at least 
some secondary schooling, to have educated parents and to live in wealthier 
households (Standing et al, 1996; Godfrey, 2003: 5; Collier and Lal, 1986).   
 
Unemployment of this kind is typically transitional, depending on the size of the 
cohort leaving the higher levels of the education system, the average length of time 
taken to find a job and lags in changes in expectations about appropriate types of job. 
Godfrey concludes that “the proportion of the disadvantaged young who are 
unemployed will vary from country to country and in many will be quite small” 
(2003: 8). The ILO also recognizes that,  
“In several developing countries, young people of higher socio-economic 
backgrounds are over-represented in the unemployment numbers because it is 
only they who can afford to spend time looking for work, without incoming 
wages” (ILO, 2004b: 8).  
 
Another rationale for current training efforts, particularly the new concentration in the 
1990s on training for the informal sector (Johanson, 2002), is the belief that the rate of 
growth of employment opportunities, especially self-employment opportunities, in 
this sector is constrained by the lack of entrepreneurial and other skills. It is believed 
that appropriate training would enable new entrants to this sector to escape from 
poverty and that it can best be supplied by non-public delivery systems.33 Yet there is 
little evidence demonstrating that TVET succeeds in upgrading the necessary skills 
for successful entrepreneurship, or even for adequate survival, on the basis of self-
employment in this demand-constrained and saturated sector (Barasa and Kaabwe, 
2001; Johanson and Adams, 2004:51; Haan, 2002: 80).34  There is also insufficient 
evidence to support the view that there are real opportunities for the poorest, least 
visible rural labour market entrants to escape from poverty through self-employment.   
 
                                                 
32 The poorest young people are, of course, “too busy working to have time to enrol on training courses of any 
kind” (Bennell, 1999: 19). 
33 The enthusiastic donor support for non-government training persists despite the fact that, “reliable information 
on the scope and performance of non-government training is difficult to find in most countries” (Johanson and 
Adams 2004: 6). 
34 In fact, “very little is actually known about the fate of the training graduates and thus of the usefulness of the 
skills imparted. In other words, the training courses are not based on pre-training skills needs assessments; nor is 
the post-training impact tracked through tracer studies. (Haan, 2002: 81). 
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There has been far too little detailed research on the specific labour market 
characteristics of the disadvantaged youth, or the poorest young labour market 
entrants, to establish their geographic and sectoral concentrations and how many of 
these young men and women are: 
 
1. badly paid wage earners in casual or seasonal jobs; 
2. apparently self-employed traders, construction workers etc, but in reality 
working on commission or  for low daily wages; 
3. engaged in poorly remunerated, distress forms of self-employment; 
4. unpaid workers in family operated enterprises with little potential to increase 
labour productivity; 
5. engaged in caring for the children they have had as teenagers, or for the 
children of other family members; 
6. engaged in viable and potentially expanding, or at least sustainable, forms of 
self-employment or family enterprise, but constrained by lack of access to 
training (and/or micro-credit). 
 
It is not adequate simply to assume that a high proportion of the population aged 15-
24 years who are not currently attending schools can be classified as falling into 
category 6, still less that they can be classified as "unemployed".  Yet, in the absence 
of up-to-date and reliable surveys of the labour force employed outside the small 
registered or enumerated, "formal" sector, these assumptions are often made.35  It 
would probably be more realistic to develop policy on the assumption that poverty-
reducing growth has always been associated with declines in the proportion of the 
labour force in self-employment and that, despite the plethora of efforts to increase 
the viability of the micro-enterprises operated by self-employed women and men in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, it is unlikely that the region will prove to be an exception. The 
poorest Africans are unlikely to escape from poverty unless more vigorous demand is 
created for the types of wage labour that they can supply. A brief discussion of the 
appropriate demand-expanding policies is provided in Section 6.3 below.  In addition, 
it will be argued that there is an urgent need to devote training resources to increasing 
the capacity of the most vulnerable members of the wage labour force to organise and 
to acquire the literacy and numeracy necessary to defend their interests against the 
least scrupulous and brutal employers (Section 6.4 below). 
 
For the historical and comparative evidence suggests that an increasingly organised 
wage labour force might develop the capacity to negotiate with employers in larger–
scale enterprises not only to implement health and safety regulations more effectively, 
but also to improve workplace training that directly improves labour productivity. In 
SSA at present, few employers provide well-designed training. For example, a recent 
survey of 177 firms in Mozambique found that less than one fifth had certified in-firm 
training programmes. About 70 percent of firms relied on informal workplace based 
training, commonly the “sitting with Nellie” model, whereby a new worker is placed 
alongside a more experienced colleague, in order to gain practical exposure and 
“training” in the range of tasks to be performed  (Webster et al, 2004: 16). Efforts in 
the 1990s to promote partnerships between governments and employers to improve 
                                                 
35 Similar assumptions are common concerning the employment status of prime aged women in rural Sub-Saharan 
Africa, with equally little justification (Sender, 2003). 
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vocational training have not been very successful (Atchoarena and Delluc, 2001:18; 
Johanson and Adams, 2004: 26; Standing et al, 1996). 
 
  
4.5 Summary and Conclusions 
 
The capacity to educate and to improve the health and skills of the next generation of 
African labour supply, particularly targeting the poorest sources of this labour supply, 
must be a central focus of labour market policy. This section has shown how difficult 
it is to define policy priorities in individual countries appropriately given the 
shortcomings of data, for example, on schooling. A key constraint on prospects for 
raising the quality of labour supplies in Sub-Saharan Africa remains the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. However, here too the empirical gaps frustrate the design of effective 
policy: despite some evidence of differential sero-prevalence rates across skill groups 
in the labour force, there is really extremely little reliable evidence to provide a basis 
for understanding, and responding to, relations between HIV/AIDS infection and 
socio-economic variables.  
 
The same empirical uncertainty clouds the assessment of the impact of HIV/AIDS on 
the capacity of the teaching profession to provide the basic literacy and numeracy that 
potential employers seek in employees. There are conflicting estimates of this impact, 
and of recent trends in teacher morbidity and mortality. The achievement of universal 
primary education in Uganda and a pronounced pro-poor shift in the benefit incidence 
of public spending on education in Malawi show, however, that HIV/AIDS need not 
be an entirely crippling constraint on educational prospects. Beyond HIV/AIDS, 
teaching capacity depends on the scale of teacher training. And in some countries – 
e.g. Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi, and Ethiopia – tertiary enrolment is especially 
low, which restricts the pool of potential teachers. Nonetheless, some evidence of 
quite rapid recent increases in tertiary education enrolments suggests that policies 
may be effective in accelerating the build up of teaching capacity. Schooling, 
particularly in poor rural areas, is weakened by high staff turnover and high pupil: 
teacher ratios, thanks to incentive structures. These too should be susceptible to policy 
reform – e.g. of salaries and promotion structures. Raising the quality of future labour 
supplies will also depend heavily on policies that strengthen demand for schooling, 
again especially in poor rural areas. These policies should include cash transfers to 
mothers conditional on their children’s school attendance, as well as accelerating the 
eradication of user fees and the abolition of uniforms in primary education.   
 
Similarly, it is important to increase the density of health workers in the population 
and to improve the provision of health facilities in disadvantaged areas. In the light of 
evidence of the positive effect of the number of physicians, nurses and midwives per 
population on mortality rates, the number of health professionals in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is very low. The health worker density varies between African countries and 
donors need to help to address this in countries where the density is particularly low, 
as in Ethiopia, Uganda, Malawi and Mozambique. Furthermore, health workers 
throughout the region remain excessively concentrated in urban areas and in curative 
facilities. Since the disease burden in Sub-Saharan Africa is composed principally of 
communicable diseases that can be dealt with by community nurses, given the cost of 
a bias in training towards degree level and registered nurses, and given the high levels 
of emigration of health professionals from Sub-Saharan African countries, this paper 
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strongly recommends a dramatic shift in donor and government health spending 
towards brief training and effective support systems for community nurses and other 
auxiliary workers who can address basic health concerns in rural areas.  
 
The evidence reviewed in this section suggests that building up basic education and 
health delivery systems and adjusting incentives and spending to ensure these systems 
more effectively reach into poor rural and predominantly rural areas are higher 
priorities than pursuing further experiments in technical and vocational education and 
training (TVET) schemes. This conclusion is reinforced by the finding of a number of 
studies that such training schemes and institutions have generally failed to orient their 
activities to the poor and especially to poor women. Such studies also show that there 
is little evidence that TVET succeeds in improving the necessary skills for successful 
entrepreneurship or basic survival in informal sectors. There would seem to be a 
greater need, before prioritising pre-entry and in-service training schemes, to develop 
more detailed research on the specific labour market characteristics of disadvantaged 
youth. There is also a case for allocating resources to improving the capacity of the 
more vulnerable members of the wage labour force to negotiate with employers, with 
a view, for example, to securing better workplace training. 
 
5. Characteristics and Determinants of Labour Mobility: Opportunities for 
Poverty Reduction
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
One estimate of the total number of international migrants, including refugees, 
suggests that Sub-Saharan Africa contains almost 50 percent of global international 
migrants, despite containing only 10 percent of the world population (Russell et al, 
cited in Baker, 1995). Analysis of patterns of mobility in Africa suggests a few 
stylised facts. First, the scale of circulation of people within and between African 
countries as well as between Africa and the rest of the world is massive. Second, the 
scale of circulation is extremely uneven. Third, population movements can fluctuate 
quite suddenly – a recent example is the surge in migration within and from Darfur in 
Sudan. Fourth, patterns in mobility change over time. This involves both shifting 
spatial patterns of mobility and changes in the characteristics of movement: who is 
moving (e.g. gender composition), where from, where to, what for, and how. Fifth, 
there is a very poor level of knowledge about the quantitative dimensions of overall 
labour force circulation in Africa. Sixth, the labour market implications of this 
population circulation are especially poorly understood.  
 
There is a tension between this immense circulation of people and the abject provision 
of transport infrastructure (see below, 5.7). This means that the conditions and costs 
of mobility can be very high and that mobility is often undertaken only in extreme 
stress. It also means that despite the remarkable mobility of Africans, there are gaps in 
the links between people and productive opportunities in many parts of the continent. 
Another implication is that huge mobility is combined with excess stability. For 
example, collective violence can both project people into accelerated or unwanted 
mobility and it can also reinforce stability and isolation in areas with low productive 
potential such as South Africa's 'Bantustans' during apartheid, or drought prone and 
semi-arid areas of Ethiopia. 
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Violence is one mechanism regulating this tension between mobility and weak 
infrastructure, information and communication. However, large-scale political 
violence is not the only factor. Coercive mechanisms that lie behind much 
‘trafficking’ are important links between population mobility and labour force 
participation. There are also other long established as well as more recent patterns of 
coerced and so-called voluntary migration, motivated and mediated by various factors 
including witchcraft allegations, divorce, infrastructural links, information networks 
and semi-institutionalised practices of corvée labour (Jeeves and Crush, 1997; Van 
Onselen, 1976).  Economic theory, in the tradition of Harriss-Todaro models of 
individuals making rational "choices" about migration destinations, has not proved 
very effective in analysing empirical migration data in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
The other main mechanism regulating population flows is social differentiation. 
Those with access to information or skills, or the resources to fund migration 
(transport costs, intermediaries’ fees, etc) are those who are most successful in 
migration over greater distances. Demographic mobility is highly uneven across Sub-
Saharan Africa and the factors affecting this mobility vary greatly. The rates of 
movement are varied over time and across countries and regions.  For example, forced 
removals to clear "Black Spots" in South Africa in the 1960s, "Villagisation" in 
Tanzania in the 1970s, "Resettlement" in Ethiopia in the 1980s and "Ivoirité” in the 
1990s all had different consequences in different regions of the countries concerned. 
The age and gender composition of population mobility also vary. And the quality of 
the labour force that is highly mobile also varies.  
 
5.2 Migration, Emigration and Immigration: Cross-Country Comparative 
Data 
 
There is very little information on the scale of flows of migrants from Africa to the 
rest of the world, though the UN International Migration Report 2002 estimates a net 
increase in the number of migrants from Africa to the developed countries during the 
1990s. Statistical analysis of international migration, from Africa to the rest of the 
world and possibly even more acutely within Africa, is fraught with data collection 
problems: censuses are scarce and often outdated; there is a lack of identity 
documents; false declarations of nationality are rife; etc.  
 
For illustrative purposes, data on recorded inflows and asylum applications to OECD 
countries like the UK help to identify trends.36 Two African countries, Somalia and 
Zimbabwe, feature among the sources of the largest numbers of asylum applications. 
UK evidence also shows that the largest increases in asylum applications in 2001, 
compared to the previous year, were all, with the exception of Afghanistan, from 
Africa (Table 16). Thus, in 2001 compared to 2000, there was a 107 percent increase 
in applicants from Zimbabwe, a 47 percent increase from Ethiopia, and and a 46 
percent increase from Sierra Leone.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 There are, of course, other examples of international migration of Africans. These often have highly 
particular characteristics. For example, it was estimated that in 1990 there were some 190,000 
Sudanese working in Iraq and a further 12,000 in Kuwait (Van Hear, 1992). 
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Table 16: New asylum applications to the UK 
 
 2000 2001 
Afghanistan 5,555 9,190 
Iraq 7,475 6,805 
Somalia 6,020 6,500 
Sri Lanka 6,395 5,545 
Turkey 3,990 3,740 
Zimbabwe 1,010 2,085 
Total incl. others 80,315 71,700 
 
Source: UK Refugee Council, Asylum Statistics 2001. 
 
 
The inflow of Africans to the UK has been very uneven, in terms of country of origin. 
Thus, in 2001, just four countries (Somalia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Ghana) 
accounted for 20,525 out of a total 28,515 people from Sub-Saharan Africa entering 
the UK in that year (Table 17).  
 
Table 17: Inflow of foreign population to the UK by country of  
nationality 
 
 1991 1995 2001 
Ethiopia 70 170 455 
Ghana 1,480 1,820 2,440 
Kenya 480 530 990 
Nigeria 2,870 3,260 5,040 
Somalia 510 760 8,290 
Uganda 110 440 740 
Tanzania 260 250 280 
Sierra Leone 290 440 875 
South Africa 1,050 1,300 4,755 
Zambia 170 190 354 
Sub-Saharan Africa total 7,870 10,560 28,515 
All countries total 53,900 55,480 106,820 
 
Source: UK Home Office Statistical Bulletin, Asylum Statistics UK 2003. 
 
 
Labour movements from Africa have expanded to non-traditional destinations within 
Europe, especially countries in Southern Europe, which have become net importers of 
labour over the last two decades. Spain, Portugal and Italy have received increasing 
numbers of migrants from different parts of the developing world and notably from 
Africa. In Italy, the number of legal workers from Senegal increased by 62 percent 
between 1995 and 1999, reaching 32,000. In Spain, Moroccans, a traditionally 
important migrant community (350,000 as of June 2004)37, remain the largest group 
of non EU residents, but other SSA countries, like Senegal (17,300), Gambia (12,000) 
and Nigeria (10,000) now account for a growing and significant proportion of non-EU 
residents, in spite of the formidable barriers facing SSA migrants to Europe.38  
 
                                                 
37 Moroccans accounted for 77 percent of all African migrants in Spain. Almost 50 percent of SSA 
migrants to Spain came from Senegal, Gambia and Nigeria. 
38 Data from the Migration Secretariat in the Ministry of Social Affairs, Spain, accessed on 25/10/04 at 
http://dgei.mir.es/es/general/tabla4_jun04.html  
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Patchy evidence of illegal flows suggests that the actual number of African entrants 
into Southern European labour markets is far greater. Even incomplete statistics show 
a massive increase in the number of boat people (crossing the sea towards Spain’s 
mainland or the Canaries) from 3,569 in 1999 to 14,893 in 2000, and the numbers 
keep growing (Castles and Miller 2003: 84). The significance of demand-driven flows 
to the underground economies of Italy, Portugal and Spain partly explains this flux of 
illegal entrants.  
 
Empirical estimates of migration between African countries are extremely sketchy. 
Data published by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) suggest there were as many as 
2.34 million international migrants in Cote d’Ivoire in 2000, and 1.3 million in South 
Africa. However, estimates of the number of unrecorded migrants in South Africa 
vary from less than 2 million to as many as 8 million.39 As a percentage of the total 
population international migrants ranged from 15.6 percent in Cote d’Ivoire in 1990 
to 1 percent in 2000 in Ethiopia (Table 18).  
 
 
Table 18: Population and migration characteristics of Africa: 1990 and 2000 
 
Mid-year 
population 
Estimated number 
of international 
migrants at mid-
year, both sexes 
(thousands) 
International migrants as 
percentage of the total 
population 
Country 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 
 
AFRICA 795,671 16,221 16,277 2.6 2.0 
 Côte d'Ivoire 15,827 1,953 2,336 15.6 14.8 
 Ethiopia 65,590 1,153 660 2.4 1.0 
 Ghana 19,593 507 614 3.3 3.1 
 Kenya 30,549 146 327 0.6 1.1 
 Lesotho 1,785 7 6 0.5 0.3 
 Malawi 11,370 1,157 280 12.2 2.5 
 Mauritania 2,645 94 63 4.6 2.4 
 Mozambique 17,861 122 366 0.9 2.1 
 Senegal 9,393 293 284 4.0 3.0 
 South Africa 44,000 1,225 1,303 3.3 3.0 
 Swaziland 1,044 73 42 8.6 4.0 
 Tanzania 34,837 574 893 2.2 2.6 
 Uganda 23,487 550 529 3.2 2.3 
 Zambia 10,419 323 377 3.9 3.6 
-- Figure is zero or rounds to 0.0. 
 
 
Source: Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations 
(2004) Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2003 Revision. United Nations: New York, 
2004. More data are available at: 
www.un.org/esa/population/publications/migstock/2003TrendsMigstock.pdf.
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 On the unreliability of the South African data, see Standing et al, 1996: 61. 
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5.3 International Flows of Skilled Labour 
 
Many of those migrating between states in large countries (like Nigeria), between 
African countries, and from Africa to Europe and North America are skilled. Many 
are college educated (Castles and Miller, 2003, 139). According to one estimate 
233,000 South Africans emigrated permanently between 1989 and 1997, most of them 
skilled (University of Cape Town survey, cited in The Economist, August 31st, 2000). 
In recent years this has become especially clear, for example, in the patterns of 
international migration observed among health sector workers. Some argue that health 
sector international migration to OECD countries is likely to continue rising, given 
labour shortages and ageing populations within a number of OECD countries.In some 
cases – e.g. South Africa and Zimbabwe, the numbers can be high: for example, 
according to one estimate some 18,000 Zimbabwean nurses work abroad 
(Mangwende, cited in Bach, 2003). In South Africa, the number of nurses seeking 
verification of their qualifications prior to applying for overseas employment rose 
from 511 in 1995 to 2,543 in 2000 (cited in Bach, 2003). According to another 
estimate cited by Bach, the flow of nurses from South Africa increased eightfold over 
the decade from 1991, of whom more than half left for the UK (see also Table A5). In 
Ghana, 60 percent of doctors educated in the 1980s have emigrated (UNDP survey 
report cited by Johnson, 2000). Overall, SSA faces the paradox of the presence of a 
large expatriate community of professionals (of the order of 150,000) and the absence 
of over 300,000 African professionals in OECD countries (IOM, 2000). 
 
Emigrants often remit and sometimes return. There are also reverse flows: thus, Sub-
Saharan African countries are significant importers of migrant labour both from other 
African countries and from beyond. Workers’ remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa are 
small fry by international comparisons: in absolute terms, no Sub-Saharan African 
country features in the top ten developing country recipients of remittances. However, 
remittances are important as a percentage of GDP in Africa, though to varying 
degrees (Table A6). Thus, Lesotho (c.28 percent) and Uganda (c.9 percent) are 
significantly more dependent on (recorded) remittances than other Sub-Saharan 
African countries. Nonetheless, the data on this subject are unreliable. For example, 
another estimate (IOM, 2000) puts the share of remittances in total GDP in Lesotho at 
50 percent. For some countries with extensive networks of informal money transfers 
(e.g. the hawalas), those linked into the foreign exchange settlement houses in Dubai, 
remittances are likely to be highly significant. For example, some estimate that the 
Somali economy “is now almost entirely remittance driven” (Ballard, 2003). 
Elsewhere, innovative transfer arrangements, such as the Kara International Exchange 
in Senegal, have prompted responses from more formalised financial organisations.  
 
At the more micro level, remittances make powerful contributions to prospects for 
survival. Evidence from West Africa suggests that remittances are allocated to 
investment in land improvement in some cases, to crucial consumption expenditure in 
others, and also to pay hired labour in agriculture (IMP, 2003). It has been estimated 
that the value of remittances lost to Sudan from the repatriation of migrant workers in 
Iraq as a result of the 1991 Gulf War was around $300 million (Van Hear, 1992). 
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5.4 Refugees, Forced Migrants and Internally Displaced People 
 
At the beginning of 2004 there were an estimated 4,285,100 “asylum seekers, 
refugees, and others of concern” in Sub-Saharan Africa, including internally displaced 
people, recently returned refugees and stateless people, as recorded by the UNHCR. 
 
 
Table 19: Countries as Origin and Destination of Refugees (end 2003) 
 
 Refugees & asylum 
seekers residing in 
country 
Returned 
refugees 
Refugees elsewhere 
originating in countrya
Cote d’Ivoire 77,292 16,600 23,741 
Ethiopia 130,284 30 61,190 
Ghana 48,034 - 15,701 
Kenya 241,535 106 3,088 
Lesotho Na Na  
Malawi 12,050 - 48 
Mauritania 530b - 30,141 
Mozambique 9,536 - 129 
Senegal  22,991 7 12,052 
South Africa 110,643 - 274 
Swaziland 1,013 - 19 
Tanzania 649,933 7 585 
Uganda 231,629 4,412 40,410 
Zambia 226,877 5 87 
 
a population at start of 2003. b Mauritania includes 29,500 people labelled by UNHCR as 
“other people of concern”, in this case mainly people from Western Sahara. 
 
Source: UNHCR (2004b), Tables 1 and 3. 
 
Six of the ten largest refugee flows by origin in 2003 were in Africa: Sudan, Burundi, 
the DRC, Somalia, Liberia and Angola. Nine of the ten largest refugee arrivals took 
place in Africa. And two of the largest populations of internally displaced people 
(IDPs) in 2003 were in Africa, in Liberia (531,600) and Cote d’Ivoire (38,000). Africa 
hosts around 30 percent of the global refugee population (Table A7). Tanzania hosts 
the fourth largest refugee population in the world (after Pakistan, Iran and Germany). 
Meanwhile, seven of the ten biggest voluntary repatriation flows during 2003 were in 
Africa, including 133,000 returning to Angola. As with the global trend, so in Africa 
more than half the refugees in Africa are female.  
 
Demographic data for some 70 percent of the 3.6 million refugees in Africa at the end 
of 2000 suggest that overall 56 percent of refugees were below the age of eighteen. 
However, this figure varies substantially between refugee populations. More than 60 
percent of refugees were children in asylum populations in Angola, Togo, the DRC, 
and Sudan, while less than 30 percent were children in those groups in Cameroon, 
Mauritania, Nigeria, and South Africa.  
 
The labour force participation implications of such flows are not always well 
understood. Nonetheless, it is very clear that dramatic and often violent upheavals in 
one country frequently pitch people into the labour force in other countries, especially 
in neighbouring countries and sometimes within the same country. Women, as 
discussed below, are often forced into providing sexual services to secure their 
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survival. Children may be drafted into government or rebel armed forces to serve 
either as combatants or as porters and cooks.  
 
South African labour markets have for a long time taken advantage of a supply of 
labour from neighbouring countries, through different mechanisms but including 
refuge from warfare. For example, during the 1980s and early 1990s there were many 
illegal immigrants from Mozambique, effectively refugees from the war there, who 
were working as wage labourers on commercial farms, as domestic servants in rural 
areas, and in the urban mining and manufacturing sectors (Sender, 2003). More 
recently, political upheaval in Zimbabwe has generated a reversal in historical 
patterns of labour migration as Zimbabweans cross into Mozambique, many in search 
of work in new agribusinesses in Manica Province. In Western Tanzania in the 1990s, 
when there were large populations of refugees, there was a widening of the market 
(e.g. for bananas) and a larger pool of labour: local farmers often hired refugees to 
work as farm labourers, paying them in food and/or cash (Whitaker, 1999).  
 
However, it is costly to migrate, even to flee. Labour migration to neighbouring 
countries can become poorer households’ asylum migration, “if the purpose of that 
migration is thought of as being broadly the security of the whole household, rather 
than more narrowly as a source of protection for an individual. For the poorest 
households migration outside the country is rarely an option, since such households 
cannot afford to send any members abroad” (van Hear, 2004, 12). 
 
5.5 Trafficking 
 
Very little is known about the scale of trafficking in human beings in Africa. There 
are no reliable estimates of levels of trafficking in Africa or globally; even the 
definition of the term remains unclear (UNICEF, 2003). What is clear is that actual 
patterns and their causes defy simple generalisations: patterns and causes vary within 
Africa, despite a general view that poverty, violence, and power (including gender 
discrimination) are key influences. There are a number of push factors. However, it is 
also clear that demand forces pull people – especially women and children – into the 
labour force through trafficking mechanisms, drawing women and girls into sexual 
labour markets and pulling women and children into domestic service or into 
agricultural labour (e.g. on West African cotton and cocoa plantations).  
 
Trafficking of different kinds – some more obviously coercive than others – is a long-
established mechanism for releasing labour supply in Africa. In northern Tanzania 
there is evidence of trafficked youth being sent back to their villages to recruit new 
children for work in the tanzanite mines. Parents are often implicated in pushing 
children into trafficking networks. Research in Togo found that it is not uncommon 
for parents to accept money from traffickers, for distant relatives to pay intermediaries 
to find work abroad, or for parents to hand over children on the promise of education 
or paid work (Human Rights Watch, 2003). There is also an overlap between 
trafficking and refugee flows. For example, there is ongoing research on trafficking of 
refugees in host countries to mobilise cheap labour (e.g. from Congolese and 
Rwandan refugee camps inside Tanzania to agricultural plantations in Tanzania).  
 
The patterns are complex. For example, one major set of flows runs from East and 
Southern African countries southwards towards South Africa, a major destination 
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country. In West Africa there is a more circular pattern of trafficking flows. Cote 
d’Ivoire and Nigeria, for example, are clearly major destinations but also countries of 
origin for flows of people to other countries in the region. Gabon features more 
sharply as a destination, while other countries like Senegal and Togo are more 
generally viewed as countries of origin. Beyond this there are important trafficking 
flows from Africa to Europe and the Middle East.  
 
5.6 Violence and Labour Supply 
 
Populations in Sub-Saharan Africa have experienced high levels of both collective 
and interpersonal violence. Violence in war and peace has substantial effects on the 
formation of the labour force: it affects the rate of growth of the labour force and its 
absolute size, and it affects the quality of labour.  
 
War in general is an “amplifier of disease” (USIP, 2001). Evidence from Uganda 
shows clearly how spatio-temporal patterns of violent conflict unleash patterns in the 
spread of HIV infection. HIV incidence in Uganda rose sharply during the war of the 
1980s, declined on aggregate during the relative peace in the first half of the 1990s 
and then rose again, especially in conflict affected areas, in the past few years 
(Epstein, 2001; Ronaldson, 2000).  It is widely accepted that seroprevalence rates are 
higher than average in military forces – according to some estimates as high as 60 per 
cent in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
 
Women have historically been targets of violence during war – both as victims of 
‘opportunist violence’ and as part of the strategy of conflict. The implications of 
wartime sexual violence have changed with HIV/AIDS. Carballo and Solby (2001) 
estimate that some 200,000 women were raped during conflict in Rwanda in the early 
1990s. Human Rights Watch (2002) and the International Crisis Group (2003) claim 
that sexual violence has reached extreme proportions in the conflict in Eastern Congo. 
If rape leads to HIV infection this affects morbidity and mortality, dependency ratios 
and conditions within households, with knock-on effects reducing children’s access to 
education. 
 
The effects of violence can include destruction of or damage to health and education 
facilities (including schools and health posts but also teachers and health workers), 
weakened access to such services because of insecurity and/or broken transport 
infrastructure, and dramatic depreciation of skills and capabilities through physical, 
psychological and relational damage. Accurately estimating such effects is 
notoriously difficult, for methodological and data availability reasons.  
 
The effects of violence on the supply and quality of labour are complex and poorly 
understood. There has been a bias in the literature on collective violence and armed 
conflict towards discussing the consequences of violence for asset wealth, as opposed 
to the consequences for labour participation. If household assets are lost (Matovu and 
Stewart, 2001), if markets are fragmented and thinned out, if household members are 
killed or debilitated as a result of violence, then a priori two consequences may 
follow. First, collective violence may produce a “retreat into subsistence”. It is often 
claimed that this is precisely what happens: as market opportunities and agricultural 
inputs become scarce, as labour productivity is weakened and households are broken 
up by violence, rural households are often expected to shrink further into a shell of 
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survival activities. Or it is suggested that, faced with the prospect of asset losses, 
“people try to protect their assets by shifting wealth abroad” (Collier, Hoeffler and 
Pattillo, 2002). However, second, exactly these conditions may be expected to push 
people into participating in labour markets where otherwise they might have resisted 
participation. In other words, even subsistence becomes unviable, so out of 
desperation people join the labour force, including women from households in which 
males have been killed or disabled or simply recruited into military forces. The 
desperate conditions of war that push people into labour force participation have a 
particular effect in that women are “often forced into high-risk sexual behaviour…by 
trading or selling unprotected sex for goods, services, and cash in order to survive 
and/or continue their travel” during war and episodes of forced migration (UNAIDS, 
2001). 
 
Normal barriers to labour market participation in some ways become even more 
constraining during war. In wartime roads and railways are often damaged or fall into 
disrepair and traffic services become scarcer. Many sources of labour demand can 
also dry up during wartime. Therefore, logically there may be a build up of labour 
market pressure during wartime. How this is resolved is bound to vary. It is 
essentially very poorly understood. Almost all work on the economics of war has 
concentrated on the livelihood and asset costs of violence and has assumed there is a 
typical retreat into subsistence. The labour market question has barely been asked.  
 
An exception is Wuyts (2003), reviewing research on wartime Mozambique. There 
the dearth of goods effectively accelerated processes of social differentiation and 
labour force participation.  “Far from retreating into a subsistence economy, therefore, 
the war and crisis heightened the need for the poorer peasantry to sell their labour to 
obtain cash to buy food and other rural wage goods”. For while war conditions break 
up some sources of labour demand they also tend to generate other sources of 
demand. Production and trade of alluvial diamonds in Angola, of coltan in Congo, of 
timber and gemstones in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and so on, are all central to war 
finance and war duration: none are possible without a labour force. However, in 
wartime conditions formal regulation of labour markets hardly exists (Krishnamurti, 
2003). Labour conditions are often regressive. Labour market opportunities in 
wartime might provide desperately needed opportunities for survival but they often 
involve awful conditions, including those of slavery.40  
 
The labour market implications of interpersonal, as opposed to collective, violence are 
similarly complex. Whether or not a person, especially a girl or woman, participates 
in labour markets, which segments of labour markets she can join, and the quality of 
her working life will depend in part on whether she has been subjected to violence, 
either as part of episodes of collective violence and warfare or as a result of 
interpersonal violence. There has been increasing empirical attention, in the economic 
literature, to interpersonal violence, including homicide, violence against children, 
and violence against and abuse of women and girls, and to the economic implications 
of this violence.41 Research has begun to reveal how common interpersonal violence 
is in many parts of the world as well as trying to trace its direct and indirect costs.  
                                                 
40 See Luckham et al (2001) and Collinson (ed.) (2003). 
41 There are different definitions of violence: they range from those emphasising more narrowly 
physical damage and intent to hurt or with lack of consent of the victim to broader definitions that 
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For example, WHO (2003) reported estimates of the rates of homicide of children 
under five years old of 2.2 per 100,000 boys and 1.8 per 100,000 girls in high-income 
countries; 6.1 and 5.1 per 100,000 boys and girls in low- and middle-income 
countries; and 17.9 and 12.7 per 100,000 boys and girls, respectively, in Africa. An 
estimated 0.9 youth homicides were committed per 100,000 in high-income countries 
in 2000, compared with estimates of 17.6 per 100,000 in Africa and 36.4 per 100,000 
in Latin America (WHO, 2004, 24).42
 
However, it is also clear that there is less evidence for these low and middle-income 
countries. Indeed, there is, generally, very little robust and comprehensive data that 
might enable a clear identification of trends or provide a basis for credible 
comparisons between countries or between different parts of particular countries.43  
 
The evidence to date shows that violence is an important factor – aside, for example, 
from wage signals – in influencing labour market participation as well as productivity. 
Women who seek wage employment against the wishes of their husbands are often 
severely beaten (Sender et al, 2004).  Interpersonal violence can damage labour 
productivity through psychological harm, physical debilitation or deprivation of 
access to education, training, welfare services and so on. This goes for violence 
outside and within the workplace itself. Interpersonal violence – especially perhaps its 
effects on girls – can reduce educational attainment. And the fiscal costs of 
interpersonal violence, which can be substantial, may have a knock-on effect on the 
budgetary scope for investing in decent health and education services and transport 
and communications infrastructure that support the development of the labour force.44  
 
Empirical evidence of domestic violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, predominantly 
against adult and adolescent women, is limited though expanding. Some evidence, for 
example, emerged from a survey of 5,109 sexually active women of reproductive age 
in the Rakai district of rural southwest Uganda in 2000/01 (Koenig et al, 2003). 
Researchers found that 30.4 percent of women in the survey had experienced physical 
threats or violence from their current male partner. The main “risk factors” associated 
with patterns of reporting domestic violence were women’s education, alcohol 
                                                                                                                                            
include psychological threats and abuse and the even broader category of “structural violence”, which 
typically highlights social institutions that repress individuals’ scope for choice and fulfilment. 
42 The direct medical costs of gunshot violence were estimated at $10,308 per victim at one hospital in 
Cape Town, South Africa, while another analysis estimated that these direct costs made up just 13 
percent of the total cost of gun violence for victims (WHO, 2004, 26). 
43 Different sources – crime reports, hospital records, household surveys, and so on – are drawn on to 
compile estimates. Many violent acts are either not reported or – as is common in the case of rape – 
reported but not recorded by officials.  
44 Pfizer (2001, cited in WHO, 2004) estimated that crime and violence together cost the equivalent of 
5 percent of the GNP of industrialised economies and as much as 14 percent of the GNP of low-income 
countries. Comparative evidence from Central America shows some of the effects of one type of non-
war violence, i.e. domestic and largely gendered violence. Some studies suggest, for example, that the 
health burden of gender-based victimisation of women between the ages of 15 and 44 is comparable 
with that resulting from other risks such as HIV/AIDS, cancer, tuberculosis, and cardiovascular 
disease. Domestic violence has inter-generational costs too: the children of abused women often have 
worse health than others. There may be no consensus on whether or not domestic violence affects 
women’s participation in the labour force in Central America. However, there is plenty of evidence 
showing that violence reduces women’s labour productivity.  
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consumption in the household, and women’s age at first sexual intercourse. Women 
with secondary schooling had lower risks of violence and women who became 
sexually active below 15 years old were more likely to have suffered recent violence.  
 
There has been more research on domestic and sexual violence in South Africa than 
elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. Some of this research focuses on particular settings, 
e.g. on pervasive – but still poorly quantified – domestic violence against women 
taking place among permanent and seasonal workers’ families living on commercial 
farms (Fast, 1997; Sunde and Kleinbooi, 1999; Parenzee and Smythe, 2003).  
 
There is also more nationally representative data. The first national female homicide 
study in South Africa collected data retrospectively on homicides of women aged 14 
and above in 1999, from a nationally representative sample of 25 mortuaries 
(Mathews et al, 2004). Of a sample population total of 3,798 female homicides, 1,349 
or just more than 40 percent of those cases for which data could be traced were cases 
of “intimate femicide”: women killed by an intimate partner. The findings suggested 
that four women are killed every day by an intimate partner and that one in every two 
women killed by a known perpetrator is killed by an intimate partner.45  
 
Another kind of violence that affects the quality of labour supply is violence against 
girls in schools. Where gender based violence and coercion are the norm, not only 
does this raise the risk of girls dropping out and experiencing teenage unintended 
pregnancies, but also it raises the risk of contracting STDs, including HIV/AIDS. Yet 
violence and abuse of girls in schools is widespread. Precise data are elusive but the 
evidence has been gradually accumulating (Hallam, 1994). This violence can be 
perpetrated by teachers and by other students. Afenyadu and Goparaju (2003) report a 
survey of 400 in-school and out of school adolescents in Dodowa, Ghana in which 
they found that in-school female adolescents were more susceptible to forced sex, 
junior secondary school girls being the most susceptible. 67 percent of girls in a 
survey in schools in Botswana (of 560 students) reported sexual harassment by 
teachers. Surveys in South Africa and Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi, and Zimbabwe 
confirm that violence against and abuse of girls in schools is a widespread 
phenomenon and that there are no government policies to address it (USAID, 2004). 
 
Most of the studies of violence against girls in schools claim that there are deleterious 
educational effects. For example, researchers in South Africa found that girls reported 
being unable to concentrate, losing interest in school, and sometimes dropping out, in 
the aftermath of sexual violence. Other studies confirm these findings (see USAID, 
2004; Leach et al, 2003).  
 
There is a range of policy challenges here. First, in many countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa there simply is very little formal legislation. However, second, in countries 
where there are formal laws and procedures designed to restrict and respond to sexual 
and domestic violence, enforcement is weak (Parenzee and Smythe, 2003). 
                                                 
45 The South African context also shows the problems of conducting research into sexual violence 
(Jewkes and Abrahams, 2000). While police records suggest 240 rapes per 100,000 women annually, 
some community surveys suggest that as many as 2,070 rapes took place per 100,000 women in the 17-
48 age group annually. Non-consensual sex within marriages is thought to be extremely common and 
barely reported at all. This is why some researchers talk of an iceberg of sexual coercion, in which 
recorded incidents are merely the small, visible tip.  
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Enforcement is weak for two main reasons. Organisations charged with implementing 
laws and procedures do not always act with much commitment (Leach et al, 2003: 
viii). And many women, especially in rural areas, either do not have enough 
knowledge of the laws or cannot get access to legal protection because of the high 
cost and poor transport and communications infrastructure. Therefore, reducing the 
effect of violence as a constraint on labour force formation and on labour supply may 
be a benefit of public investments that, as this report argues, have other labour supply 
objectives. Other policy initiatives are also necessary. These include investment in 
public information campaigns through radio and health posts; incentives to police to 
improve recording of gender-based violence incidents; and potentially – following 
initiatives in parts of Latin America – creating women-only police stations.  
 
5.7 Transport and Communications Infrastructure 
 
Increased mobility is an important part of the process of poverty reduction, with both 
private and social returns. Constraints on mobility restrict the potential labour supply 
in response to geographical labour demand and deprive people of access to 
information, remittances, and ideas, which contribute to raising labour productivity.  
Cross-country econometric studies tend to show a clear positive effect of investment 
in infrastructure on growth; however, some of the poverty-reducing effects show 
through more clearly in studies of different regional performance within large 
developing countries. This is the case in IFPRI analyses of India and China: in both 
countries the research suggested the need for incremental spending for poverty 
reduction on rural roads. The IFPRI work also showed that a “particularly important 
factor in the reduction of poverty in both countries was growth of rural non-farm 
employment and this in turn was heavily dependent on the availability of 
infrastructure services” (Willoughby, 2002, 7).  
 
Transport infrastructure helps not just by facilitating labour mobility and labour 
market participation but also through easing the provision of and access to other 
services that raise labour market quality. For example, research in Vietnam 
(Deolalikar, 2001) suggests that the presence of a road in a community brings about 
sizeable improvements in secondary school enrolment and use of public health 
facilities in poorer provinces (while making a smaller difference in better off 
provinces).46 Other research reinforces the significance of transport infrastructure 
spending on poor areas but argues that the return to transport investment is raised 
significantly when it is combined with spending on education, health and other 
services. An additional argument for integrated policies is that they are required to 
reduce the danger that facilitating labour mobility will also spread HIV/AIDS, as well 
as other sexually transmitted diseases.  Migration is commonly cited as an important 
factor contributing to the spread of HIV/AIDS (Pison et al, 1993; Lurie et al, 2003).  
 
There are four broad categories of people for whom increasing transport infrastructure 
provision and usage means a higher risk of exposure to HIV/AIDS: people employed 
in building and maintenance of infrastructure; people working for transport service 
                                                 
46 See also Glewwe et al (2000). Nonetheless, it is remarkable how the questionnaires behind survey 
data on infrastructure and poverty typically fail to ask detailed questions about labour market 
implications of infrastructural provision, beyond the issue of labour-intensive infrastructure 
construction.  
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providers; those working in the sector as managers; and passengers.47 For example, 
road construction in Malawi has been linked to the spread of HIV/AIDS; there have 
been high seroprevalence rates recorded among bus and truck drivers in Cameroon 
and Tanzania (and for their female partners); the increase in mobility associated with 
the onset of peace and the reconstruction of transport infrastructure in Mozambique 
after 1992 was associated with accelerating seroprevalence rates; the most recent data 
for Mozambique suggests that prevalence is very much lower in the more remote rural 
Northern areas that are far from the major trade and transport corridors; and so on.48
 
Africa’s transport infrastructure is notoriously limited. Rural road density has been 
estimated at about 32 m/km2 in Western Africa and 36 m/km2 in Eastern and Southern 
Africa on average (Riverson et al., 1991, p. 4). Even this provision is highly unequal. 
Three countries in West Africa (Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Nigeria) account for 
more than half the rural roads, while in Eastern and Southern Africa four countries 
(Madagascar, Tanzania, Zaire and Zimbabwe) account for more than two-thirds of the 
rural roads. Another study shows that rural road density varies in West Africa from 17 
km/1,000 km2 in Ghana, to 36 km/1,000km2 in Cameroon, to 94 km/1,000 km2 in 
Cote d’Ivoire (Table 20). Nigeria has about 97 m/km2 of rural roads, “but an 
acceptable ‘target’ density, based on Indian experience in areas with similar 
population densities to those in Nigeria, would be about 730 m, that is, more than 
eight times as much as the latter country presently has” (Platteau, 1996). Villages are 
typically distant from all-weather roads. Even in Zimbabwe, 75 per cent of farms are 
situated more than 5 km away from an all-weather road (ibid). 
 
Table 20: Rural Road Network in Selected African Countries 
 
 Total (km) Density (km/1,000 km2) 
Cameroon 18,000 36 
Cote d’Ivoire 30,224 94 
Ghana 4,000 17 
Mozambique 6,725 17 
Nigeria 67,425 97 
Tanzania 20,760 66 
 
Source: NEPAD, Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development 
Programme, 2002 (http://www.fao.org/docrep/005)  
 
Moreover, rural roads in much of Africa are of poor quality. Some 10 per cent are 
paved, compared with about 35 per cent in Asia. During rainy seasons many roads are 
impassable. According to one study, in Tanzania the percentage of roads in good 
condition in 1990 was 24 percent, compared to 50 percent in Malawi, 40 percent in 
Zambia, and 32 percent in Kenya. 
 
                                                 
47 World Bank, “Document 3(A): HIV/AIDS and the Transport Sector”, in Considering HIV/AIDS in 
Development Assistance: A Toolkit. 
48 On Cameroon  and Tanzania see AIDS Analysis Africa, Vol.4, No.5 (1994) and Vol.5, No.2 (1995) 
respectively; on Mozambique see the Mozambique Human Development Report, 1998. Fieldwork 
evidence from Nampula Province (Mozambique) suggests that seroprevalence rates are substantially 
higher in areas close to stations along the railway line between the port of Nacala and Malawi. 
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An important implication is that for many people in Africa the costs of mobility are 
extremely high and the means generally basic. Many rural Africans live in a “walking 
world” because they are too far from roads and/or because of the lack of transport 
services. Indeed, rural transport costs are higher than anywhere else in the world. 
Porter (2002) cites estimates that transport charges for journeys of up to 30 km are as 
much as two and a half times more expensive in Africa than in Asia. Transporters in 
Ghana’s Central Region, for example, commonly charge double for journeys over bad 
roads. Living “off road” has critical implications for the quality of the labour force. 
Access to health care is typically bad: research in Ghana and Uganda suggests, for 
example, that vaccination programmes may miss off-road settlements (Porter, 2002). 
Access to markets and traders is poor. And access to credit institutions and rural 
banks or post offices is extremely limited.  
 
Communications infrastructure as well as transport infrastructure is highly unevenly 
distributed between African countries (Tables A27 and A28). For example, the 
distribution of fixed and mobile phone subscribers per 1,000 people varies from 4.76 
in Ethiopia and 10.58 in Malawi to 54.98 in Senegal and 352.63 in South Africa.  
Apart from the need to travel and to communicate, migrant and mobile workers 
urgently need to have access to financial services.  In particular, they need safe and 
low-cost money transmission and savings facilities, in order to meet their obligations 
to the children and women who depend on their remittances in rural areas.  Private 
sector financial institutions, such as banks, have not found it profitable to establish 
widespread rural branch networks in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The growth of such private 
networks usually depends on prior state investments, for example in rural post offices, 
to establish savings habits and create the market for subsequent private financial 
sector growth.   
 
The spread of rural post offices, postal collections and savings facilities is uneven 
across Sub-Saharan Africa.  Table 21 shows that there are large differences between 
countries in the number of post offices that accept financial transactions, ranging from 
only 60 in Uganda to 485 in Kenya, 327 in Ghana and 241 in Tanzania.  The average 
number of inhabitants served by each post office in Ethiopia is about 116,000, 
compared to 29,000 in Ghana and 36,000 in Kenya.  There has been little research on 
the potential role that rural post offices could play in facilitating labour market 
integration, financial flows and savings in rural Africa.  In addition, the absence of 
modern money transmission facilities probably contributes to the prevalence of 
robberies, banditry and armed gangs of youth threatening the survival prospects of the 
poor and pensioners in several regions of Africa (Issa, 2004; Cross, 2003: 20). 
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Table 21: Post Offices Accepting Financial Transactions, 2003 
 
 Number of Post 
Offices 
(Permanent and 
Mobile) 
Accepting Financial 
Transactions 
Average 
Number of 
Inhabitants 
Served by a 
Permanent Post 
Office ('000) 
Average Area 
Covered by a 
Permanent Post 
Office 
( '000 Km2) 
Cote DÍvoire 192 86 1.7 
Ethiopia 130 116 1.8 
Ghanaa 327 29 0.3 
Kenya 485 36 0.7 
Lesotho 47 12 0.2 
Malawi 176 37 0.4 
Mauritaniab 61 - 16.8 
Mozambique 117 69 2.9 
Senegal 137 74 1.4 
South Africa  2,137 17 0.5 
Swaziland 39 19 0.3 
Tanzania 241 88 2.2 
Uganda 60 - 0.7 
Zambia 180 46 3.2 
 
aData for 2001 
bData for 1999 
Source: Universal Postal Union, Postal Statistics, 2004: http://www.upu.int
 
 
5.8 Summary and Conclusions 
 
The movement of people in Africa and its implications for labour supply are 
characterised by the same unevenness, between and within countries, that other 
sections of this paper have shown to be a feature of all labour supply trends in the 
region. The evidence reviewed above suggests two significant themes. First, two of 
the most important mechanisms regulating flows of people are coercion and social 
differentiation. The majority of Africans who migrate voluntarily are able to do so 
because they have advantages compared to others: advantages in wealth, knowledge, 
status and contacts. Second, there is a tension between this high labour force mobility 
and the conditions of transport infrastructure, financial market infrastructure, and 
communications. The extreme unevenness as well as generally poor provision of 
infrastructure throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa reinforces the significance of 
the two mechanisms mentioned above – coercion and socio-economic differentiation 
– in shaping patterns of mobility and labour market participation. Further, the 
condition of the infrastructure, especially in rural areas, raises the costs for those left 
behind of education, health care, access to savings institutions, and access to 
opportunities for migration.  
 
There are many pressures on political leaders to design and impose further intentional 
barriers to mobility. These are commonly driven by ideological anxieties about 
population movements, fears for the effects on sending communities of out migration 
or brain drain, and fears of people in ‘host’ populations about a rising tide of migrants 
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unfairly competing with local workers. On both efficiency and equity grounds, there 
should ideally be no barriers designed to restrict population movement within Sub-
Saharan Africa or from Africa to the rest of the world. Administrative impediments to 
mobility are frequently expensive to run and invariably ineffective. Given that those 
with the wherewithal generally succeed in migrating across borders and 
internationally, adding legal barriers to those that already exist is only likely to 
reinforce the inequalities in the labour force and to deepen poverty.49 Further, these 
policies effectively criminalise migration and, therefore, drive people into the 
unregulated and exploitative working conditions that are the fate of so many migrant 
workers.  There is an urgent need to develop new policies and new types of temporary 
immigrant workers programme that more actively promote the interests of migrant 
workers by more clearly defining, and more effectively enforcing, certain core rights 
of migrant workers. 50 The policy emphasis, in other words, should shift away from 
trying to repress the irrepressible to trying to protect the rights of and prospects for 
African migrants. 
 
The aim of policy should be both to improve communications and transport 
infrastructure dramatically, and to encourage institutional and policy reforms that 
recognise and record migrant labourers as a foundation for protecting them from 
abusive working relationships. The benefits of this policy approach would include: 
facilitating the circulation of remittance money within families; making more people 
easier to reach with vaccination programmes, HIV/AIDS testing and prevention 
campaigns, and other health and education services; and reducing the scope for 
violent and super-exploitative intermediaries to fill the gap in aiding mobility.  
 
There is a case for new forms of policy intervention to manage particular types of 
labour flows, however. As discussed above, there has been a rise in the number of 
health sector professionals migrating from African countries – to other African 
countries and further afield. The policy options for tackling this situation include: 
greater sharing of information on vacancies between countries; public sector 
involvement in labour migration schemes for public sector service professionals; and 
greater expenditure on salaries and to improve the working conditions of nurses and 
doctors in countries like Ghana and Zimbabwe from which there has been substantial 
leakage in recent years. In OECD countries, most of which fall short of published 
targets for ODA as a share of GDP and in many of which there are political 
complaints about the public cost of care for refugees and immigrants, there should be 
greater education on the role of nurses and doctors from Africa, given that African 
countries are effectively subsidising health service provisions (public and private) in 
the OECD countries. One estimate is that the scale of these subsidies is of the order of 
$500 million per annum (Joint Learning Initiative, 2004: 102). 
 
                                                 
49 This argument is supported by Hatton and Williamson (2002). On the basis of projections from 
historical evidence of mass migration from poor Europe in the late nineteenth century to future mass 
emigration flows from Africa, they argue that the magnitudes of African migration to Europe are likely 
to rise considerably over the next few decades. They argue that some efforts to restrict migration and to 
seal porous borders might be partially successful but that they will create unpleasant side effects. 
“European restrictions will create a greater share of illegals and thus greater absorption problems in 
recipient nations: European restrictions will create more poverty in African sending regions. And 
European restrictions will create considerable diplomatic problems between the two regions”. 
50 The practical and ethical arguments underpinning the design of such programmes have been 
examined by Chang and Ruhs (2004). 
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6. Conclusions: Some Implications of a New Policy Focus on the Poorest, 
Most Disadvantaged Labour Force Entrants 
 
6.1 National Data Gaps  
 
Data on labour supply and employment are difficult to obtain and are less reliable 
than many other socio-economic indicators. Gaps in the data are evident in the most 
basic official tabulations.51 The donor agencies do not appear to recognize the severity 
of these problems, since they have not prioritised policies to improve the data on 
African labour markets. This paper argues that there is a need for more and better pro-
poor survey and statistical work on African labour markets.  
 
High labour participation rates and low levels of “formal” sector recorded 
employment are a remarkable feature of the published data on Sub-Saharan African 
labour markets. The typical national household survey shows that agriculture accounts 
for 60-80 percent of the labour force; most adult household members are classified as 
either ‘independent’, ‘own account’ agricultural producers or ‘unpaid family 
workers’. These three categories usually account for about 80 percent of the 
agricultural labour force. However, these categories are ‘residual’, in the sense that 
enumerators assume, without detailed investigation of patterns of activity over time, 
that most people are own-account or family workers in rural areas. It follows that, if 
these own account occupations are taken as given and if few young people are in 
schools or colleges, then labour market participation rates are high by definition. 
 
The concepts and interpretations of ‘employment’ and ‘unemployment’ are deeply 
ambiguous. Depending on how questions are worded and interpreted by survey 
respondents and enumerators, one or another dimension of unemployment will take 
precedence, thus making international and even intra-national comparisons 
misleading. Given the definitions in use, it is obvious that unemployment rates in 
many Sub-Saharan African countries will be low by international standards, because 
of the very low levels of unemployment recorded in rural areas where, as argued 
above, most people are simply assumed to be engaged in some type of activity.  If 
some studies suggest that unemployment is high, especially among certain groups like 
the urban youth, their results may be explained mainly by differences in sampling, in 
definitions used, and in the way conventions of data collection are applied.52  
                                                
 
In sum, the insufficient coverage and differences in definitions, years, and sources of 
data may lead to spurious and misleading comparisons between African countries. 
Moreover, the concepts and definitions used (employed, economically active 
population, unemployed) may be inappropriate, since their meaning depends on the 
 
51For example, the ILO’s Global Employment Trends 2003 presents labour market indicators for 19 
African countries, but data for employment growth covering the period 1995-99 are only given for 
three of these countries, while data for the whole period 1990-99 are available for four countries.  
Unemployment rates are given for 14 countries in 1999, but only for two countries in 1990. 
Nevertheless, labour force growth estimates are presented for all 19 countries, simply as estimated 
projections from general population data, available from censuses (ILO 2004e, pp. 138-45).  
52In spite of efforts to standardise definitions, these still vary between countries; small variations, e.g. 
in terms of the minimum age accepted for employment questions (as shown in Table A13), can have a 
significant impact on the comparability of data across countries. Most researchers working with cross-
country datasets are unaware of or indifferent to this problem (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 1994).  
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level of development and the specific features of labour markets. Unfortunately, the 
poorest Africans participate in precisely those labour markets that cannot be 
understood on the basis of official statistics. 
 
6.2 Microeconomic Research on Unregistered/Unrecorded Wage Labour and 
the Need for New Modules for LSMS 
 
Many recent household sample surveys show tiny proportions of people in wage 
employed categories.  Their samples include very few agricultural workers, domestic 
servants, cleaners, porters, bus drivers and touts, migrant workers engaged in road 
construction, bar tenders, workers on food stalls or in restaurants, petty salesmen 
(employed by traders), etc.  However, these wage workers, as well as women working 
for wages in the sexual services sector, are very numerous in the rural and urban areas 
of Sub-Saharan African countries. The quantitative importance of the waged work of 
domestic servants has been obscured by the tendency to record non-kin-related 
residents in households as “unpaid family workers”, when it would be more 
appropriate to classify them as domestic servants, receiving irregular and small 
amounts of pocket money, food and lodging as their wage.   
 
Many, but not all, of these statistically invisible wage workers belong to the poorest 
quintile of rural households; a more disaggregated classification of the different types 
of irregular wage employment would identify those segments of the unenumerated 
rural labour market that contain the largest numbers of very poor people. For 
example, there is micro-survey evidence that suggests that the poorest rural 
households in the Ivory Coast and Kenya are far more dependent on unskilled farm 
wage income than the richest households and, in Rwanda, dependence on unskilled 
wage labour is higher in female headed and illiterate households (Barrett et al, 2001: 
12, 26).53
 
The ILO has stressed the lack of reliable statistics on waged agricultural labour and 
highlights the need for “comprehensive disaggregated statistics”, since wage 
employment in agriculture in poor countries is “invisible” in most conventional 
databases (ILO, 2003: 42).   Other empirical studies have highlighted the neglect of 
rural non-farm employment in national datasets (Elbers et al, 2003; Bryceson 1999), 
as well as the fact that casual labour markets are dynamic in rural areas and that non-
agricultural employment in rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa is significant and 
growing (Reardon 1997; Kevane 1994; Sender 2003; Wiggins 2000; Adams, 1991).  
Limited evidence from African micro-surveys (Sender, 2002; Sender et al, 2004), as 
well as strong evidence from India, suggests that the move from casual forms of rural 
wage employment to more regular rural wage employment, implying higher annual 
real wages, is decisive in reducing poverty (Ghose, 2004: 5112).  Thus, a key 
indicator of poverty reduction, largely ignored in official statistical publications, is the 
rate of growth of real wages in rural areas.  The wage rate for (female) casual 
agricultural labour is usually the lowest real wage rate in the economy.  Monitoring 
changes in these real wages is particularly relevant for assessing trends in standards of 
living in the poorest households.  
 
                                                 
53 More than 60 percent of rural households in the Ivory Coast and Kenya (and more than 44 percent of 
Rwandan households) earn income from off-farm agricultural wage labour, usually seasonal, casual 
labour (ibid). 
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The results of random household surveys, such as the LSMS, are usually presented as 
the most accurate and complete information concerning the characteristics of poor 
people, including their employment patterns. However, LSMS sampling techniques 
and their questionnaires do not take full account of the degree of heterogeneity within 
rural areas.  The problem is that, in African contexts, the distribution of all rural 
resources and opportunities, including access to different types of employment, is 
extremely uneven (Kevane 1994; Reardon 1997; Bryceson 1999; Sender 2003). Thus, 
important ‘pockets’ of various forms of wage employment, which are by no means 
uniformly distributed throughout the country, may easily be missed in random 
surveys. Also, significant movements of labour to and from some dynamic ‘pockets’ 
may not be captured because LSMS sampling frames are inaccurate , or because 
standard definitions of “the household” and its “residents” are too narrow, leading to a 
failure to collect information from “non-residents” concerning migration episodes in 
search of wage employment.   
 
The risk of failing to include large numbers of disadvantaged labour force entrants in 
the sample provides a rationale for complementary sampling approaches, purposively 
designed to capture the characteristics of specific groups of wage workers, especially 
those engaged in seasonal, casual and low-paid jobs outside major urban centres. 
These are people not usually “resident” in “households”.  They live and work for long 
periods in hostels, barracks, construction sites and illegal squatter settlements, or they 
have been given some space to sleep at their workplace during the harvest season, or 
while working as domestic servants.   These types of employees are easily missed in 
conventional samples such as LSMS or DHS, because of their focus on a random, 
population-census-weighted selection of rural and urban enumeration areas and their 
choice of “household residents” as the unit of analysis.  
 
There are other problems in the way recent household surveys have been conducted 
that have resulted in insufficiently detailed labour market information covering 
specific occupational categories.  To overcome these problems, more appropriate, 
disaggregated and context-specific occupational and status categories are required, in 
order to understand the complexity of what is often vaguely called ‘informal’ 
employment.54   Ideally, more detailed information could be derived from more 
comprehensive labour force surveys (LFS) but, as shown in Table A11, these are 
organized irregularly and with substantial lags.   Instead, living standards 
measurement surveys (LSMS) and Household Budget Surveys have now become the 
main source of socio-economic data in Sub-Saharan Africa. Unfortunately, these 
surveys have been driven by the search for extraordinarily detailed consumption data 
for the calculation of national poverty incidence rates.  The result is that other types of 
policy relevant socio-economic survey that focus on the specificities of rural labour 
market activity or HIV sero-prevalence, for instance, have been neglected.  
 
The employment sections of LSMS are very brief.  They aim to collect very general 
information for international comparisons.  LSMS employment modules ask standard 
questions concerning employment during a very short reference period (one week).  
However, in any particular week, a rural person who often works as a casual wage 
                                                 
54 The definition of the informal sector adopted in 1993 by ILO has significant loopholes and remains 
vague, leaving room for different interpretations. Estimates of ‘informal’ employment and activities are 
often indirect, based on the residual balance technique, which depends on different choices of 
assumptions.  These choices frequently differ between sources (Charmes, 1999). 
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labourer could be engaged in some form of self-employment.  Similarly, a person who 
is often engaged in non-farming activities could be engaged in farming.  This is 
recognised by the Indian National Sample Survey Organisation, which regularly 
investigates employment patterns every five years, using a much longer reference 
period - 365 days.  These surveys are richer in content and relevance than the standard 
labour force surveys or the LSM Surveys conducted in Africa (Ghose, 2004).  In a 
few countries (including Mozambique), there has recently been an effort to include a 
question that departs from the standard conventions and covers a reference period that 
extends across the entire agricultural season, e.g. “Has any member of the household 
been hired out during the last agricultural season?”  However, there is still a great 
deal of room to incorporate more detailed questions concerning people’s experience 
of seasonal and irregular employment in an expanded LSMS employment module.  In 
the current LSMS questionnaires, respondents are rarely given the opportunity to 
describe their full array of occupations or to discuss the details concerning their 
allocation of labour to different survival strategies.55
 
Merely extending the reference period to capture seasonality does not guarantee the 
reliability of estimates of economic activity. In an ongoing village-level survey in 
Mauritania, an implausibly high proportion of respondents answered ‘never’ to the 
question “Have you participated in any kind of remunerated activity over the past 12 
months?” in two of three sampled villages. Subsequent responses to other, open-
ended questions concerning their activities made it obvious that most people, 
including children, had in fact undertaken remunerated activities, but their 
understanding of the initial question, the meaning they attached to ‘remunerated’, and 
the inability of inexperienced interviewers to capture inconsistencies, could have 
resulted in a very low estimate of the number of people who were economically active 
and an artificially low estimate of the employment-to-population ratio. Thus, open-
ended questions can play an important role in questionnaire design, as can the training 
and career prospects of enumerators.  The problem is that, when implementing the 
standard modules of large-scale nationally representative surveys, researchers have 
often found it difficult to include context-specific open-ended questions, or to ensure 
enumerator quality56.  LSMS has not managed to avoid the problem of unreliable, or 
even fabricated data arising from inadequate monitoring and training of enumerators, 
as is well-documented in the case of its South African surveys (May, 2004: 6). 
However, it will be difficult to ensure enumerator quality and, at the same time, insist 
on downsizing public sector employment. 
                                                 
55 New instruments have recently been developed in KwaZulu-Natal to overcome the problems evident 
in South African LSMS data.  The preliminary results from the Risk and Vulnerability in Employment 
Survey and the Socio-economic Study of the Persistence of Poverty and Inequality are extremely 
promising; they clearly demonstrate the large amount of labour market activity missed in LSM surveys 
(Lund, 2004; Adato et al, 2004: 17). Similarly, the Ministry of Finance in Mozambique has recently 
completed a large scale survey of rural wage labour in three Provinces, using questionnaire instruments 
and interviewing techniques  specifically designed to improve upon LSMS employment modules 
(Sender et al: 2004). 
56 For example, in the CWIQ 2000-01 organised in Mozambique, two questions concerning the hiring 
in and out of seasonal labour were included and it was expected that these questions would uncover 
valuable new information about rural labour market dynamics and poverty. However, a simple check of 
the database showed that a high proportion of households claiming to farm large areas of land, of the 
order of 20 hectares and more, also claimed they did not hire in any workers. This is not a credible 
result and illustrates the possibility of serious measurement errors when implementing large-scale 
surveys, using inadequately trained enumerators. 
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There is also a tension between prioritising nationally representative consumption 
surveys and the need for more reliable data on employment issues. Given the 
weakness in capacity and logistical resources of many African statistical institutions, 
the donor-sponsored focus on the calculation of “the national poverty line” often 
comes at the expense of the depth, comprehensiveness and quality of the data relevant 
for analysing the dynamics of poverty.  At least three steps should be taken to enhance 
the quality of information on labour supply: 
  
1. Conventional surveys that aim at statistical representativeness must make 
greater efforts to intensify the training and improve the long-term career 
structure for a professional enumeration staff, to minimise the biases arising 
from interviewer-respondent interactions;  
2. All large-scale surveys should be prepared to depart from international 
conventions, recognising that household questionnaires have to be adapted to 
take account of the specific local contexts of labour transactions, as well as the 
household fluidity and variability that is often emphasised in micro-level 
research; 
3. New types of complementary survey should purposively select samples of 
workers, rather than “households”, focusing on those workers that micro-
surveys have identified as the most disadvantaged and lowest paid labour 
market participants.  
 
The results of a new pro-poor statistical research agenda could fill important data 
gaps and lead to a more realistic discussion of the characteristics of labour markets 
and (self) employment trends, particularly for the most disadvantaged labour force 
entrants.  These results are also required to identify policies that are affecting and 
could increase the demand for female and poorly educated labour in the agricultural 
sector, as well as in the services, transport and construction sectors in rural areas. 
 
6.3  Sectoral Policies for Pro-Poor Investment 
 
The main policy recommendations of this paper are complementary and some specific 
policies serve multiple objectives. This is especially important given the high cost of 
reaching all areas of a country with investments in social and economic infrastructure. 
There is an argument for concentrating policies and expenditures in particular areas, 
to maximise their gains; this in turn may help to generate over time a stronger 
material basis for a future spread of investment to other areas. Section 5 showed that 
the population of Sub-Saharan Africa is highly mobile but that this mobility is 
constrained by financial costs, information barriers and other obstacles (including, in 
some countries at some times, political barriers to movement). What this means in 
practice is that the bulk of population movements typically do not involve the poorest 
Africans. Poorer Africans who do migrate are more likely to move only over short 
distances unless they are mobilised by violence.  
 
Yet historically and in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa labour mobility has played 
an important role in improving people’s material existence. For example, wage 
remittances by Mozambicans working on the farms and mines in South Africa and 
other neighbouring countries through much of the twentieth century fuelled a process 
of investment and accumulation within parts of rural Mozambique (Newitt, 1995). In 
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Ethiopia, seasonal labour migration to coffee growing areas played a significant role 
in the survival strategies of poor rural northerners from the 1930s onwards, as did 
migration to urban and farming employment opportunities in neighbouring Eritrea and 
Sudan (McCann, 1987, 192), till political restrictions on population mobility were 
imposed during the 1970s and 1980s. Seasonal labour migration within Ethiopia 
began to revive in the early twenty first century (CDPR, 2004). Thus, a key to the 
poverty reducing potential of rural-rural labour migration by extremely poor labour 
market participants, both in the past and more recently, has been the necessarily 
uneven pattern of dynamism in commercial agriculture.  
 
Policies that increase the demand for unskilled wage labour on plantations, in 
agribusiness and on dynamic medium-scale farms, combined with policies to reduce 
the costs of migration from areas of concentrated poverty to areas with greater 
economic prospects, may therefore have significant poverty reducing potential. At the 
heart of these policies must be greater efforts to concentrate labour-intensive 
infrastructure investments, focusing on areas where agro-climatic conditions are most 
favourable for economic expansion (and, above all, expansion of export volumes). 
This policy has the benefit of rationalising expenditures in a context of generally high 
per capita costs for infrastructure investment in Africa.  
 
The poverty reducing impact of concentrating infrastructure investments on areas with 
strong agro-export potential can be maximised by (re)designing fiscal and other 
incentives to encourage production of those crops that demand relatively high levels 
of wage labour inputs. Labour-intensive crops (and female wage labour intensive 
crops) are often precisely those for which there is an export market. Thus, data from 
Computerised Enterprise Budgets (COMBUD) in South Africa, for example, suggest 
that irrigated crops require at least five times more labour on average than non-
irrigated crops and that crops such as papaya, guava, avocados, tobacco and chillies 
use between 4,000 and 10,000 hours of labour per hectare, compared to dryland 
maize, oats, ryegrass and wheat, which according to COMBUD require less than 15 
hours per hectare in many areas (Standing et al, 1996, 263).  
 
There are obvious complementarities between this policy focus and other priorities, 
such as the need to manage balance of payments constraints. There are other 
complementarities too. Improvements in transport infrastructure reduce the costs both 
of providing and also of getting access to social infrastructure, including health and 
education facilities and services. In selected rural areas it may then prove relatively 
cheap to maintain and equip primary schools and easier to recruit and retain teachers; 
it will also be easier to provide rural women with antenatal care, treat STDs and 
provide condoms, to promote public campaigns to reduce violence against girls in 
schools, to enforce laws against domestic violence and to experiment with women-
only police posts. If these policies – educational, health oriented, export revenue 
generating, and infrastructural - are conceived as integrated priorities, it may then 
become possible to use improvements in transport infrastructure as a means of 
slowing down HIV transmission rather than accelerating it.  
 
Investments to improve rural infrastructure in the very poorest countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa and a focus on dynamic export-oriented agricultural zones, i.e. areas 
like the coffee and horticulture/floriculture zones of Ethiopia, or the highest potential 
agricultural areas of Mozambique, would have another important benefit. Such a 
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focus would make it easier for union officials to generate ‘voice’ among a critical 
mass of poor and often female agricultural workers and for donors to encourage 
government officials to monitor compliance with the international labour standards to 
which they are signatories.  
 
6.4 Voice and the Bargaining Power of Disadvantaged Labour 
 
The education and health status of the poorest labour market entrants and their 
children is low in absolute terms, but this paper has stressed relative deprivation 
within each country, particularly the scale of the inequalities between poor workers’ 
access to the services that would increase their productivity and that achieved by more 
privileged Africans. It was suggested these inequalities might be explained in political 
economy terms by analysing the balance of political power between different social 
classes and its influence on policy.  The argument was that the bargaining power of 
the most disadvantaged labour market participants was extremely weak and that pro-
poor strategies should make direct attempts to support the political “voice” or 
bargaining power of the most vulnerable wage workers. 
 
In many parts of the world and in several African countries, trade unions have 
historically led political struggles for the fundamental rights to which donors have 
now committed themselves, such as democracy and the universal provision of basic 
education and healthcare.  They are potentially important allies in poverty reduction 
strategies and in any attempt to improve labour quality, as well as in efforts to 
promote realistic research on employment and real wage trends.  But their potential 
has yet to be tapped by donor projects and, unfortunately, the donors appear to have 
missed the opportunity provided by the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 
process to strengthen the role of workers organizations in policy formulation, 
implementation and monitoring.   
 
A review of trade union participation in the PRSP process in 23 countries, including 
10 Sub-Saharan African countries, concluded that, “no union has reported being 
engaged in the drafting, implementation, or monitoring and evaluation. In a number of 
cases, unions have attended meetings on the PRSP but have not been able to make 
responses due to late delivery of background material, lack of capacity to analyze and 
present alternative proposals or simply because they were invited to only one or two 
such sessions. They have variously classified such a process as ‘cosmetic’, ‘symbolic’ 
and ‘unsatisfactory’”(Egulu, 2004: 10).  The same review called for more attention to 
be paid by donors to capacity building programmes to strengthen unions (ibid: 12). 
 
The need for donors to strengthen their links with the trade union movement and with 
other organizations that represent workers has also recently been stressed by the UK 
Secretary of State for International Development. His Department has made the 
economic case for supporting decent labour standards in poor countries, arguing for 
the need to raise efficiency by ensuring that women are not excluded from labour 
market opportunities, as well as for minimum wage legislation and enforcing the 
obligation to provide decent and safe working conditions, since these standards can 
reduce wasteful labour turnover and facilitate creativity and cooperation in the 
workplace.  Their arguments also make it clear that too few resources are being 
allocated to improve the capacity of African governments to strengthen the 
performance of their health and safety inspectorates.  DFID therefore argues that, 
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“The World Bank could be more active in promoting labour rights…” and has 
supported the case that the International Finance Corporation should make adherence 
to core labour standards a condition for their loans (DFID, 2004: 26). 
 
Trade Unions in Sub-Saharan Africa need external support not merely to increase 
their ability to represent the interests of their existing members, but also to organize, 
mobilize and educate an extremely large pool of poor and casual workers active in the 
unenumerated sector.  Their existing capacity to reach such unorganized workers, 
especially in rural areas, is very limited, although unions in some countries have made 
greater efforts to mobilize new members outside their traditional constituency, as well 
as women, than others (Konings, 2003; Beckman, 2002). The ILO (2004d, 340)has 
recognised this problem. It emphasises the institutional and capacity obstacles to the 
emergence of effective and accountable representative organisations for workers in 
unenumerated sectors and calls for “voice coalitions” between workers in the informal 
economy and formal workers and their trade unions. This paper supports the 
recommendations by the ILO and DFID for substantial new initiatives to promote the 
organisation of coalitions between wage workers in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Appendix Tables 
 
  
 
Table A1: Recent Data Sources for Analysing the Labour Market 
Country Census 
(last and 
previous) 
LSMS / 
CWIQ 
(last and 
previous) 
Labour 
force 
survey 
Mauritania 2000 
1988 
2003 
2000 
 
Senegal 2002 
1988 
2001 
1994 
1991 
Cote d’Ivoire  1998 
1988 
1985-88  
Ghana 2000 
1984 
2002 
1998 
 
Ethiopia 1994 
1984 
2000 
1992 
1999 
Kenya 1999 
1989 
1997 
1994 
 
Uganda 2002 
1991 
1997 
1992 
2003 
Tanzania 2002 
1988 
2000 
1993 
2000 
Zambia 2000 
1990 
2002 
1998 
1999 
Malawi 1998 
1987 
2002 
1998 
 
Mozambique 1997 
1980 
2003 
1997 
Planned in 
2004 
South Africa 2001 
1996 
1999 
1995 
2000 
Lesotho 2001 
1996 
2002 
1995 
 
Swaziland 1997 1995 
1985 
 
Sources: WB, UN Population Censuses, national statistical offices 
Note: LSMS=Living Standards Measurement Surveys; CWIQ=Core Welfare 
Indicators Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
Table A2:  Population Distribution by Youth and Adult Age Groups and Estimated Labour Force Growth in Selected Regions,  
(1980, 2000 and 2015) 
 
 Industrialized and Transition 
Economies 
S.E. Asia Sub-Saharan Africa 
Age Group 1980       2000  2015 Labour Force 
Growth 
2003-2015 
1980 2000 2015 Labour Force 
Growth 
 2003-2015 
1980 2000 2015 Labour Force 
Growth 
 2003-2015 
15-24 Yrs          16.6 13.7 11.6 -3.1% 20.3 19.9 15.9 3.6% 19.0 20.2 20.3 28.2% 
25+ Yrs 61 67.9         71.2 2.6% 39.0 47.7 53.9 25.4% 35.4 35.5 36.1 30.8 
Youth Share in 
Working Age Population 
 
21.4 
 
5.8 
 
14.0 
   
34.2 
 
29.4 
 
23.9 
 
34.9 
 
36.3 
 
36.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Child labour (Working Children Aged 5 to 14) in Thousands, Using 
Unweighted Regional Averages 
Region 
 
Total 
 
Percent of Cohort 
   
Transition countries 8 310 14.6 
Asia 110 390 18.7 
Latin America 16 466 17.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 37 902 25.3 
North Africa and Middle East 9 027 10.2 
Total 182 096 18.5 
Source: ILO, 2004, p29, table 3.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4: Index of Inequality in Grade Four Completion for 15-19 Year Old 
Boys and Girls, by Household Wealth1 
 
Country Boys Girls Gender Gap 
(Boys minus Girls) 
Cote D'Ivoire 0.48 0.67 -0.19 
Ethiopia 0.76 0.90 -0.14 
Ghana 0.21 0.19  0.02 
Kenya 0.03 0.04 -0.01 
Malawi 0.28 0.28 … 
Mozambique 0.64 0.84 -0.19 
Senegal 0.73 0.84 -0.11 
South Africa 0.06 0.04 0.02 
Tanzania 0.21 0.35 -0.14 
Uganda 0.29 0.45 -0.16 
Zambia 0.35 0.32 0.03 
 
1 Educational attainment is measured by the percentage of 15 to 19 year olds in a household that have completed 
four or more years of schooling, among those who have entered school. The inequality index ranges from 0, 
representing complete educational equality between the richest 20 percent and the poorest 40 percent of 
households in a given country and a value of 1, indicating a complete lack of educational opportunities for the 
poor.  A score of 0.5 implies that the poorest 20 percent have reached half of the levels of educational attainment 
f the rich. o  
Source: Lloyd and Hewett, 2003: 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A5: Initial admissions to the UK nursing register by country 
 
 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 
 
Philippines 52 1,052 3,396 7,235 5,593 
India 30 96 289 994 1,830 
South Africa 599 1,460 1,086 2,114 1,368 
Australia 1,335 1,209 1,046 1,342 920 
Nigeria 179 208 347 432 509 
Zimbabwe 52 221 382 473 485 
New Zealand 527 461 393 443 282 
Ghana 40 74 140 195 251 
Kenya 19 29 50 155 152 
Zambia 15 40 88 183 133 
Malawi 1 15 45 75 57 
Botswana 4 - 87 100 39 
Total incl.others 3,621 5,945 8,403 15,064 12,730 
 
Note: The decline in figures in 2003 does not indicate a break in the trend but reflects 
the backlog in processing of registration that accumulated towards the end of the 
year. 
 
Source: Nursing and Midwifery Council, Statistical Analysis of the Register, www.nmc-
uk.org  
 
 
 
 
Table A6: Workers’ remittances received by country ($bn) 
 
 1995 1999 
Lesotho 0.4 0.3 
Nigeria 0.8 1.3 
Senegal 0.1 0.2 
Sudan 0.3 0.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.7 3.5 
East Asia & Pacific 8.3 10.6 
Latin America & Caribbean 12.8 16.9 
Middle East & North Africa 8.6 10.5 
South Asia 10.0 15.1 
 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2003, World Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A7: Refugee population by UNHCR Bureau, 2003 
 
UNHCR Bureau Begin 2003 End 2003 Annual change (%) 
Central Africa & Great Lakes 1,301,700 1,257,900 -3.4 
East & Horn of Africa 937,600 768,100 -18.1 
Southern Africa 321,200 306,200 -4.7 
West Africa 528,000 531,200 0.6 
Total Africa* 3,088,500 2,663,400 -7.3 
 
* excluding North Africa 
 
Source: UNHCR (2004), Refugees by Numbers, 2004 Edition, Geneva: UNHCR 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A8:  Road network and incidence of paved roads, 1970s 
 
 Density of road network 
(km/km2) 
Percentage of paved roads 
Botswana 0.02 9.5 
Burkina Faso 0.06 5.1 
Congo 0.02 6.5 
Ethiopia 0.03 28.0 
Kenya 0.09 9.7 
Malawi 0.05 12.2 
Mali 0.01 11.1 
Nigeria 0.11 40.2 
Senegal 0.07 23.0 
Tanzania 0.02 35.0 
Zaire 0.06 1.5 
Zambia 0.05 13.0 
   
Bangladesh 0.35 32.0 
India 0.41 38.8 
Indonesia 0.41 37.2 
 
Source: Platteau, 1996. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A9: Infrastructure Provision in Sample Countries 
 
Country Name 1999 2000 2001 
 
Cote d'Ivoire    
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 32.8 49.82 62.52 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 5.51 6.09 7.2 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 9.7 .. .. 
    
Ethiopia    
Electric power consumption (kwh per capita) 21.42 22.07 21.83 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 3.29 3.93 4.76 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 0.74 0.95 1.15 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 13.3 12 .. 
    
Ghana    
Electric power consumption (kwh per capita) 252.78 320.17 350.14 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 11.62 18.17 20.83 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 2.54 2.97 3.34 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 29.6 .. 18.4 
    
Kenya    
Electric power consumption (kwh per capita) 118.03 105.94 116.77 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 11.45 14.64 29.6 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 4.36 4.89 5.59 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 12.1 12.1 .. 
    
Lesotho    
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 15.94 20.34 36.29 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 18.3 .. .. 
    
Malawi    
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 6.3 9.1 10.58 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 0.99 1.16 1.25 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 18.5 .. .. 
    
Mauritania    
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 6.66 13.45 51.76 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 8.06 9.81 10.33 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 11.3 .. .. 
    
Mozambique    
Electric power consumption (kwh per capita) 59.54 57.26 266.06 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 5.46 8 13.71 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 3.02 3.51 3.96 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 18.7 .. .. 
    
 
Senegal    
Electric power consumption (kwh per capita) 114.46 120.57 129.71 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 27.35 47.89 54.98 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 15.09 16.8 18.36 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 29.3 29.3 .. 
    
 
South Africa    
Electric power consumption (kwh per capita) 3703.68 3643.14 3792.71 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 248.08 304.46 352.63 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 60.39 66.38 69.57 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 20.3 20.3 .. 
    
Swaziland    
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 46.25 64.68 85.29 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) .. 11.9 15.69 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) .. .. .. 
    
Tanzania    
Electric power consumption (kwh per capita) 54.95 56.77 58.49 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 6.32 10.84 17.13 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 2.52 3.06 3.57 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 4.2 .. .. 
    
Uganda    
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 5.12 10.88 13.94 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 2.48 2.61 2.94 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 6.7 .. .. 
    
Zambia    
Electric power consumption (kwh per capita) 585.67 567.77 584.59 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 11.13 17.71 19.55 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 6.5 6.81 7.09 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) .. 62.3 22 
    
Source: World Bank (2004). 
 
 
Table A10: Radio and television receivers in 1997 
 
Number of radio 
broadcasting receivers 
Number of television 
receivers 
Region 
Total 
(millions) 
per 1,000 
inhabitants 
Total 
(millions) 
per 1,000 
inhabitants 
Developing 
countries of which: 
1 124 245 720 157 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
121 202 29 48 
Arab States 71 269 31 119 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
204 412 101 205 
Eastern Asia and 
Oceania 
558 306 461 253 
Southern Asia 160 118 73 54 
Least developed 
countries 
85 142 14 23 
Developed 
countries 
 
1 308 1 061 675 548 
Source: UNESCO (2004). 
 
  
Table A11: Labour Force Surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Country Year Survey Name
Angola 1992 Inquerito sobre emprego e desemprego na cidade de Luanda 
Ethiopia 1999 National Labour Force Survey 1999 
Gabon 1994 Enquête Emploi Chômage 
Madagascar 1996 Enquête emploi 
Mali 1997 Enquête sur l'Emploi et le Chômage au Mali 
Nigeria 1984 Labor Force Survey 1984 
Rwanda 1988 Enquête nationale sur l'emploi 1988 
Senegal 1991 Enquête emploi, sous emploi, chômage en milieu urbain 1991, 
région de Dakar 
Tanzania 2000 Integrated Labor force survey 
Zambia 1999 Child Labor Survey and End of Decade Survey 1999 
Source: Africa Poverty Monitoring database, World Bank 
 
 
 
Table A 12:  Differences in Unemployment Rates by Region 
 
 Unemployment Rate (%) 
 
 1993 2002 2003 
Eastern Africa 10.3 10.9 11.0 
Central Africa 12.8 9.3 9.4 
Southern Africa 27.1 30.1 31.6 
Western Africa 7.1 6.8 6.7 
 
Source: ILO 2004e, extracted from Table 6.1  
 
 
 
 
 
Table A13: Differences in ILO Data Sources and Definitions Covering the 
Economically Active Population 
  
Age 
limit Years (between 1980 and latest) 
Main 
source 
Cote d’Ivoire 6+ 1988 PC 
Ethiopia 10+ 1980, 1984, 1988, 1991-95, 1999 OE, PC 
Ghana 7+ 2000 PC 
Kenya 10+ 1989 PC 
Lesotho n.a. n.a.   
Malawi 10-64 1983, 1988, 1998 
PC and 
LFS 
Mauritania 6+ 1988 PC 
Mozambique 12+ 1980 PC 
Senegal 6+ 1983-85, 1988, 1995 OE and PC 
South Africa 15+ 1980, 1985, 1991, 2003 
PC and 
LFS 
Swaziland 12+ 1986 PC 
Tanzania 10+ 2001 LFS 
Uganda n.a. n.a.   
Zambia 15+ 1980, 1981, 1984 OE,  PC 
Source: LABORSTA, 
ILO.   
Note: PC = Population Census; OE = Official Estimate; LFS = Labour 
Force Survey. 
 
 
 
 
